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Coming Next Month

January, 1964

Our January issue is devoted to a study of the nations of Latin America, their stability and their progress. Seven specialists will discuss the following:

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Brazil

by JOHN J. JOHNSON, Professor of History at Stanford University, and author of *Political Change in Latin America: The Emergence of the Middle Sectors*.

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CURRENT History

DECEMBER, 1963

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In this issue, seven specialists evaluate economic and political crises in the nations of Africa. As our first observer sees the situation, "increasing police, diplomatic and military cooperation" among white minority administrations in Africa may portend "the shadow of a far greater crisis . . . now gathering over the whole of Southern Africa."

Angola: A Non-Self-Governing Territory

By KEITH IRVINE
Specialist in African Affairs

ANGOLA—a West African country under Portuguese administration—lies south of the Congo River. It takes its name from the Ngola, which was the dynastic title of the chief of the Kimbundu people. The Ngola owed fealty to the Mani-congo, who ruled over the ancient kingdom of Congo to the north. This association, which dates back at least as far as the early sixteenth century, still has significance. In 1961 alone, 150,000 Angolan refugees,¹ fleeing Portuguese military action, sought refuge in the Congo. The destinies of Angola and of the Congo, now as then, remain interrelated.

Angola, with a coastline over 1,000 miles long, has a total area estimated at 481,351 square miles, an area larger than Portugal, Spain and France together. In the 1960 census, the population of Angola was estimated to be 4,832,677. In 1959, the non-

African population totaled 255,394, of which 208,541 were Europeans, and 46,853 were mestizo. Since March, 1961, African nationalists in the north of Angola, seeking independence, have been fighting a guerrilla war with the Portuguese army.

March, 1961, therefore, marks the opening of the present phase in the long relationship between Portugal and Angola. This relationship dawned with the arrival of the Portuguese captain, Diogo Cao, off the mouth of the Congo River in 1483. In time, the slave trade, conducted from coastal "factories," became the dominant Portuguese interest in Angola. Until 1822, Angola was the primary source of slave labor for the plantations of Brazil.² Portuguese relations with the interior of Angola remained minimal. Sporadic attempts to link Angola in the west with Mozambique in the east, thus forming a giant trans-African colony, never succeeded because no expedition from one could ever reach the other. In the period when "Britannia Ruled the Waves," Britain, Portugal's oldest ally, became the commercial power behind Portuguese rule, as it still is today. How-

¹ Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (1963) (A/5511/Rev.1).

² Although officially abolished in 1878, the slave trade in Angola continued at least until 1924, when an American professor, R. E. Ross, gave evidence to the League of Nations on the slave trade in Angola.

ever, with the waning of the slave trade, Portuguese interest in Angola also waned, until comparatively recently.

The new Portuguese interest in Angola is reflected in the immigration statistics. Between 1940 and 1950, the number of Portuguese in Angola almost doubled, to 100,000. Between 1950 and 1960, the total number doubled again, reaching over 200,000. The statement that Portugal has "been" in Angola for almost 500 years is misleading. Portuguese slavers fastened on the Angolan coast for centuries, with governmental approval. But it has only been since the Berlin Act of 1885 that the Portuguese presence has been internationally recognized; and it is only since the end of the Second World War that Portugal, an impoverished country of 8,889,000 inhabitants (a 1952 report stated that 3,500,000 of these were "excess"), with an average per capita income of about \$200 (less than that of Ghana), has conducted a determined drive to settle its surplus population in Angola. It is this new wave of colonization that has in part led to the war in Angola. Expropriated from their lands in favor of Portuguese immigrants, the African population has resorted to arms. When conditions already bad³ became worse, and when, at the

same time, other West African countries moved forward to freedom and independence, this was an understandable reaction of the African population.

That Angola should become an independent African state is the conviction—as the most recent United Nations voting record shows—of the majority of United Nations member states,⁴ notably including Brazil, the only Portuguese-speaking nation in the Americas. It is also the conviction of many Portuguese, some of whom seek the "Brazilian solution" for Angola. It is not, however, the conviction of the present Portuguese Government.

THE PORTUGUESE POSITION

Speaking in Lisbon, on August 12, 1963, Oliveira Salazar, Prime Minister of Portugal since 1932, stated, apropos of his "overseas" (i.e., colonial) policy:

At bottom the position may be summarized as follows: as a nation we are the trustees of a sacred heritage; we consider that it is our duty, and to the interest of the West, to safeguard it, and we sacrifice ourselves by fulfilling that duty in which many do not believe, even though they benefit from it.

The difference between Dr. Salazar and most other world leaders can be expressed in various forms. One way of expressing the difference would be to say that Salazar and his government look to their country's past for a solution, whereas most other governments look to a new future. Another form of expressing the difference would be to say that Salazar and his government, basing themselves upon metropolitan law (as did France in relation to the status of Algeria) maintain that Angola, together with other Portuguese possessions overseas,⁵ are provinces of Portugal. Angola, therefore, they say, is an integral part of the national territory.⁶ Most other governments maintain,⁷ on the other hand, that Angola including the enclave of Cabinda,⁸ like the other Portuguese possessions overseas, is a "non-self-governing territory" (the United Nations term for "colony"). From this it follows, they maintain, that Portugal is bound by its United Nations

³ In 1954, the London Anti-Slavery Society (founded in 1823 by the abolitionists) stated: "We have no hesitation in saying that conditions and practices in Portuguese West Africa are among the greatest known causes of misery in the world today."

⁴ Resolution 1819 (XVII) of the U.N. General Assembly on the "Situation in Angola" was adopted on 18 December 1962 by 57 votes to 14 with 18 abstentions. This article was written on 1 October, 1963, before the voting of the 18th U.N. General Assembly had taken place.

⁵ Other Portuguese possessions are: The Cape Verde Archipelago; Guinea (called "Portuguese Guinea"); the islands of Sao Tome and Principe and their dependencies; Mozambique; Macau and dependencies; and Timor and dependencies. The enclave of Goa and dependencies was united with India in 1961. The West African enclave of Sao Joao Batista de Ajuda was united with Dahomey in the same year.

⁶ Despite this, the Salazar administration issues different postage stamps for Angola and for Portugal.

⁷ As they did in U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1542 (XV).

⁸ Cabinda, a Portuguese enclave of 3,000 square miles on the coast north of the Congo River, is administered as one of the 13 districts of Angola.

Charter obligation firstly, to submit information on the territory, as stipulated in Article 73 of the Charter, and secondly, in consequence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of Angola "without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or color, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom," as called for in Resolution 1514 (XV).

Both the Portuguese government and the African nationalist movement to which it finds itself opposed have, however, ceased to argue much about differences, even indirectly.⁹ Instead, both have moved from words to action. Although statistics concerning the number of guerrilla nationalists now engaged in fighting the Portuguese are difficult to establish, more than 60,000 Portuguese soldiers—the bulk of Portugal's armed forces—are now pinned down in Africa. Some of these soldiers are in Portuguese Guinea, where fighting is also in progress, but the great majority are in Angola itself. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Ben Bella of Algeria, who has been providing military training for Angolan guerrillas, and who has pledged arms and money, also promised to send 10,000 Algerian volunteers to help Angolans to end Portuguese rule in their country.

At the Summit Conference of Independent African States, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in May, 1963, 32 African states demanded the breaking off of diplomatic and consular relations between all African states and the Government of Portugal, as long as it persisted in its present attitude towards decolonization. They also asked for an effective boycott of the foreign trade of Portugal by (a) prohibiting the import of Portuguese goods; (b) closing African ports and airports to Portuguese ships and planes; (c) forbidding Portuguese planes to overfly the territories of all African states. Arrangements were made to supply practical and financial aid to the national liberation movement. Perhaps the greatest success of the Addis Ababa conference, however, was the establish-

ment of a committee to investigate the differences between the different African nationalist movements in Angola, and to attempt to harmonize them.

As a result, after a meeting of this committee at Dakar, it was agreed that the African states would henceforth recognize and support the provisional Angolan government-in-exile of Holden Roberto, rather than the rival *Movimento Popular de Liberacao de Angola* (M.P.L.A.). After Agostino Neto of the M.P.L.A. unexpectedly entered into a political alliance with the pro-colonial leader of the Congo (Brazzaville), Prime Minister Youlou Fulbert, and after Youlou Fulbert was unexpectedly overthrown in a coup d'etat in 1963, a large section of the M.P.L.A. split away to join Roberto's Angolan Front of National Liberation. Despite efforts of the Portuguese to divide the African nationalists, the nationalists succeeded in maintaining unity.

UNITED NATIONS ACTION

Portugal is, today, the only country of Europe which is at war. In consequence, it is hardly surprising that the situation in Angola has been considered on several occasions by the United Nations. Apart from the General Assembly itself, the Security Council has considered the situation in Angola three times since March, 1961. The most recent occasion was in July, 1963, when, after a delegation of four African foreign ministers had addressed the Security Council on behalf of the 32 African states, a resolution was adopted on July 31. In this resolution, the Security Council urgently called upon Portugal to cease all acts of repression in territories under its administration, and to withdraw military and other forces at present employed for that purpose; to promulgate an unconditional amnesty and to establish conditions that would allow the free functioning of political parties; to enter into negotiations, on the basis of the recognition of the right of self-determination, with the authorized representatives of the political parties with a view to the transfer of power to political institutions freely elected and representative of the

⁹ The African nationalists stated before hostilities began that their approaches were rejected.

peoples; and to grant independence immediately thereafter to all the territories under its administration.

The Security Council also requested all states to refrain forthwith from offering the Portuguese government any assistance which would enable it to continue its repression and to take all measures to prevent the sale of arms and military equipment for this purpose to the Portuguese government. Other United Nations organs, notably the Special Committee of 24 on Decolonization,¹⁰ had considered the question, and had heard petitioners and made recommendations.

That Prime Minister Salazar himself is conscious of the trend of world opinion against him was clearly shown in his major policy speech of August 12, 1963, when he referred to the need of "understanding" one another "not in the face of the world—this would be pretentious—but in the face of the attempt to set up a universal government which is sought to be made through the United Nations." He also referred to the possibility of Portugal quitting the United Nations (to which it was admitted with 15 other states on December 14, 1955). Until now, however, Portugal, like South Africa, has considered that obstinacy is the better part of valor; and, furthermore, an attempt is being made to ride out the rising storm. Meanwhile, although no move has yet been made to expel Portugal from United Nations membership (despite the clear inconsistency of its attitude with its Charter obligations), action has been taken against Portugal in certain United Nations organs or affiliates. For example, on July 24, 1963, the United Nations Economic and Social Council, meeting in Geneva, voted 7-0 with 11 abstentions to expel Portugal from the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa.

Of particular importance to Salazar was the attitude of the United States towards Portugal's African policy. In his August 12 speech, Salazar stated that "the interests of

European defense" were "badly shaken by the Africa policy of the United States," in which the United States was attempting "to work for and help with all its power to set up independent states all over Africa." He went on to draw a comparison between United States and Soviet goals in Africa. "To the East," he said, "the strong State economies; to the West, the big capitalist syndicates—both aiming to capture and control markets." He concluded that as a result Africa would soon witness "the era of neo-colonialism," and that "this competition in African space may well lead to an entente such as was formerly designated by definition of zones of influence but may now take another name." After referring to the "very special relations between the Congo and the United States," he went on to add that a "kind of terrorist organization" had been set up in Leopoldville, in the Congo, "for the purpose of operating in Angola and avowedly supported by funds from America."

Meanwhile, the Portuguese government has been negotiating with the United States on a new treaty regarding United States base rights in the Azores, where the airfield at Lajes is a refueling point for United States strategic bombers and air transports, and where it is believed that a classified naval installation has been added in support of Polaris missile submarines.

UNITED STATES POLICIES

In effect it would seem that without concern for the Azores bases, United States dissatisfaction with Salazar's policies not only in Africa but also in Portugal itself might have found more open expression. Senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, asked U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara on June 13, 1963, what possible justification there could be for rental payments by the United States for bases in Spain and Portugal when both benefited more from the installations than did the United States itself. When McNamara replied that per capita income in these two countries was very low and that both would require some

¹⁰ i.e., Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

form of aid from the United States apart from rentals for bases, Fulbright replied: "Well, let it be on that ground then, and not on the argument that these installations are primarily for the United States, which I very much doubt."

The view of the United States administration meanwhile, was placed on record on July 26, 1963. At that time, Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson told the Security Council that the United States regarded Angola and other Portuguese-administered territories as non-self-governing territories. He also reaffirmed United States support for the principle of self-determination,¹¹ and said that the United States had continually supported "measures calling for the Portuguese recognition of that principle." Emphasizing that change would come in the Portuguese colonies, he described the present situation as a stalemate that would be broken "one way or another, in the not too distant future." Stressing the need for "a dialogue," in the interests of peaceful change, he said that Portugal's role in Africa would be ended "only if it refuses to collaborate in the great and inevitable changes that are taking place." Making it clear that the United States favored "consultations" between the African states and Portugal, he asserted that the United States already favored restricting the sale and supply of arms and military equipment to Portugal for use in its African territories.

The philosophical basis of United States differences with the Salazar government was also indicated in the statement by United States Secretary of State Dean Rusk, when he was questioned on his reaction to Salazar's criticisms of United States policies in Africa

at a press conference on August 16, 1963. Rusk replied that it was "a very practical notion in the modern world that political arrangements are stable and promising when they clearly rest upon the consent of those directly involved." He added that "we would hope that this factor could be taken fully into account, and that the European relationship to Africa, or the Portuguese presence in Africa, could be sustained by the demonstrated consent of the people."¹²

United States policy towards Portuguese Africa has been sharply criticized by Africans. Barely two weeks before Salazar's August 12 speech, Holden Roberto, Prime Minister of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Angola in Exile (GRAE), which is established in Leopoldville, also expressed criticism. By supplying arms to Portugal, said Roberto, the United States was participating indirectly in Portugal's war in Angola.

Earlier, on June 21, 1963, President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana pointed out that the arms used by Portugal were not manufactured in Portugal, nor were they paid for by Portugal, since Portugal could not for one year continue to maintain the military apparatus that she was using for suppression in Africa. Nobody in his country could justifiably question the avowed purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but Angola in the *South Atlantic* was not a part of North Atlantic defense.

COMPLEXITIES

Clearly, contradictions have arisen between the African policies of Salazar's Portugal and the policies of the United States. In part the split may be said to be ideological—almost, one might say, philosophical. The Portugal of 1963 seeks to hold to the past: the United States of 1963 to move forward to the future. But certain further complexities must also be taken into account. The struggle between the Old World and the New is complicated by the involvement, directly or indirectly, of simple power politics without ideological, much less philosophical overtones. Some inkling of the situation may be gained by recalling the recent statement of United Nations Secretary General U Thant—who is given on

¹¹ Later President Kennedy in his address to the 18th session of the U.N. General Assembly on 20 September 1963 also referred to "the belief of the American people in self-determination for all peoples."

¹² Three days earlier the Portuguese Foreign Ministry had disclosed that before the end of 1963 a plebiscite on Portuguese policies in overseas territories would be held not only in metropolitan Portugal but also in Angola and other overseas territories as well. What questions were to be put, to what sections of the populations they were to be put, and whether the Portuguese police or army were to play any role in the holding of the plebiscite were not, however, stated.

occasion to making straightforward and refreshingly revealing statements—at his press conference on June 28, 1963. After stating that in the past two-and-a-half years the United States and the Soviet Union still retained their pre-eminence as the two world powers, he said:

My feeling is that in the '70s, if there are '70s, the world will witness four big powers—the United States of America, Europe, Russia and China. I am convinced that it will be the path of wisdom for world leaders to take these considerations into account in the formulation of foreign policy.¹³

Seen in this light, it will be clear that not only the United States-Soviet confrontation referred to by Salazar is in question, but that European and Chinese involvement must to some degree also be considered, even although we have not yet safely arrived at 1970. Apropos of China, it is of interest that Salazar in his August 12 speech said (in reference to Soviet-American rivalry in Africa):

The two most powerful nations compete—or three, for Communist China has also put in her appearance there.

Apropos of Europe, each of the colonial or former colonial powers has traditional interests in its former colonies, which bring it into opposition with United States, Soviet, and Chinese interests, quite apart from the state of its relations with African nationalism.

EUROPE AND AFRICA

The future of Europe in relation to Africa remains to be considered. At this point in history, Europe's relations with Africa are directly related to the evolution of the European dynamic represented by the policies of President de Gaulle of France.

Europe, in short, is beginning to re-assert European policies throughout the world which are often different from those of the United States. These emerging policies are often not yet fully in focus, because they are not yet by any means fully co-ordinated. De Gaulle, for example, has cooperated in the transformation of many French colonies into

independent African states. Salazar's African policies, however, remain clearly out of focus when compared with those of Gaullist Europe. Such contradictions are best seen by examining the relations of Salazar's Portugal with those of his nearest neighbor, Franco's Spain.

The Iberian partnership (of Spain and Portugal) is an alliance of comparatively long standing. The first serious public differences of approach have become manifest over African policy. At a private meeting of Salazar and Franco earlier this year, African policies were reportedly discussed, but differences were not reconciled. Spain has few African possessions, and, in harmony with Franco's friendly relations with de Gaulle, Spain is attempting to bring its colonial policies slowly into line with those of Gaullist Europe. Despite some transitional tensions, Spain has also succeeded in preserving relatively good relations with Morocco. Shortly before Salazar's August 12 speech, in which Salazar announced Lisbon's intention to fight if necessary to hold its African possessions, the Spanish cabinet announced that autonomy would be granted to Spain's two West African possessions, Rio Muni and Fernando Po. (The status of other Spanish possessions in North Africa involves negotiations with Morocco).

Not even Spain's public defense of Portugal at the United Nations on September 24, 1963, can hide the fact that the Iberian nations do not see eye to eye on African affairs. With respect to Portuguese economic interests in Africa, a Spanish official was recently quoted as saying:

We would like to see Lisbon adopt a more realistic approach to this problem, perhaps set up a timetable for self-government in Africa within the framework of the Portuguese family. Apparently this is not possible, so we can only say that we appreciate Portugal's problems—and express the hope that Portugal can appreciate ours and our necessity of acting as we do.

Salazar has clearly decided that the best way to defend Portugal's economic interests in Africa is to remain intransigent and to fight if necessary.

¹³ U.N. Press Release: Note No. 2773.

However, certain constitutional changes are being introduced in Portugal's African territories. Three questions may therefore be asked: what are, in fact, Portugal's economic relations with Angola? What constitutional changes are being effected? When it comes to fighting, to whom will Salazar look for help?

ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH ANGOLA

Article 158 of the Portuguese Political Constitution states:

The economic organization of the Portuguese Overseas Provinces shall form part of the general economic organization of the Portuguese Nation and shall thereby take its place in the world economy.¹⁴

In practice this has meant that Angola's economy has been deliberately retarded lest the economic upswing, once begun, lead inevitably to political independence. (Despite the existence of the so-called "Escudo Zone," the escudo has been given a different value in Angola from the value that it is given in Portugal itself.) Salazar's Portugal, conscious of the fact that Angola is the richest of all the Portuguese colonies, and that, as one commentator has pointed out, "it might well become richer than Portugal in less than a generation,"¹⁵ has in the past assigned to Angola the role of producer of raw materials—

coffee, sisal, diamonds, sugar, manganese, copper and cotton, among others, with the exportation of aluminum and iron ore expected to begin soon.¹⁶ Angolan oil production is also becoming significant, but when a large new refinery was to be built recently to handle the increasing output, it was decided to build it in Lisbon and not in Angola. In addition, Portugal has been chary of foreign capital investment in Angola, and although United States, European (especially German) and Japanese capital has been permitted to enter, it is only since the outbreak of fighting in March, 1961, that the attitude of the Portuguese administration towards investment has become somewhat more liberal. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Portuguese-Angolan businessmen have felt that Portuguese mercantilism has held back Angolan development, and have even suggested that the capital of Portugal might appropriately be moved from Lisbon to Luanda. The long-feared economic upswing has now perhaps begun, and even the recently created "Portuguese Common Market"¹⁷ is unlikely to prevent it from running its course until Angola finally reaches, one way or another, its own "Brazilian solution."

"NON-RACIAL" THEORY

Economic and social developments are, of course, inter-related, so that it may be appropriate to note that one of the principal arguments used by the Portuguese to justify their various failures in Angola has been that the Portuguese are a people who do not practice racial discrimination. This, however, is hardly the opinion of the United Nations General Assembly, which has noted "that racial discrimination is in fact widely practised and that the economic life of Angola is to a large extent based on forced labor."¹⁸ Primary education in Angola is *in theory* compulsory for all children of all races living within a three-mile radius of a school. The Portuguese government is, however, apparently incapable of providing any details as to where schools are located, and where the main concentrations of population throughout the country are to be found.¹⁹ The Uni-

¹⁴ Associated Press report datelined Madrid, published in the "Christian Science Monitor" on 7 September 1963.

¹⁵ "Dr. Salazar Changes His Line in Africa," London "Times," 12 September 1963.

¹⁶ Coffee, sisal, and diamonds account for 62% of Angola's exports.

¹⁷ The Portuguese Common Market was created by the Decree Law of November 1961, with a view to achieving the economic integration of all the "overseas provinces" with Portugal. Portugal does not belong to the European Common Market.

¹⁸ U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1819 (XVII) of 18 December 1962. Although forced labor is now illegal in Angola, and although Portugal is bound by the Forced Labor Convention of 1957, an International Labor Organization (I.L.O.) Commission which visited Angola in 1961 to investigate charges that forced labor was practiced there reported that "forced labor was still being employed." (Vide, for example, paras. 738, 741, and 764 of the Commission's report).

¹⁹ In 1955, in Angola 61 per cent of the Europeans but only 5.6 per cent of the Africans lived in urban areas. Portuguese official sources quote different and wildly varying figures as to the number of schools in Angola.

ted Nations Economic Commission for Africa, in a recent study,²⁰ observed that "so far Portuguese non-racial theory in Africa has foundered on the rocks of the grim poverty of the African masses, the harsh labor laws, and constitutional anachronisms."

CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

Until 1951, Portugal, like the rest of the world, regarded Angola as a Portuguese colony. In that year, however, Portugal incorporated the main provisions of the Colonial Act of 1930 into its revised Constitution, which stated that the Portuguese colonies were henceforward—in Portugal's view at least—"Overseas Portugal." The administrative structure was regulated by the Overseas Organic Law of 1953, according to which Angola had a Governor-General, a Legislative Council, and a Government Council.

The system, however, proved inadequate for contemporary conditions. The fighting in Northern Angola, constitutional progress elsewhere in Africa, international criticism of Portuguese policies, and changes in Europe itself in the direction of European unity, all combined to demonstrate to Salazar that further changes were necessary in "Overseas Portugal." A series of legal reforms was instituted in 1961—notably the repeal of the Native Statute of 1954—which represented a minor and hardly adequate effort on the part of Portugal.

Now the Overseas Organic Law has been reformed to permit (to quote Salazar) "greater representation in local organs; more power for these organs in the sphere of local administration; greater intervention of the Provinces in the direction of national policy"—in a word, some decentralization. Certain powers previously held by the Minister of Overseas Provinces are now transferred to the Governor-General and to the elected legislative council. Significantly, Lisbon is no longer to be the sole budgetary authority: local authorities are now to be permitted a substantial degree of authority in budgetary

matters. Portuguese Angola (as distinct from African Angola) is also to be permitted more representation in Portugal's own governmental institutions. A university is also to be established in Angola.

The bulk of the Angolan population, however, lives as it were in a different world, where local—and Angolan—influences are ultimately of more significance than Lisbon's political maneuvers. The shape of Angola's future institutions may ultimately depend more on the ethnic interrelationships of Angola's people—Kikongo, Kimbundu, Ovimbundu, Bangala, or Chokwe—than upon the decrees of Lisbon. Before the institutions of a free and independent Angola can be established, many months, if not years, of trial are at hand. The Angolan people are now called upon to endure a time of troubles, during which the armed forces of Lisbon roam throughout the land. Whether this period will conclude, as elsewhere in Africa, with the withdrawal of armed force, and the establishment and organization of national institutions, remains to be seen.

A frantic effort is now in progress to transfer, quickly and before the international community prevents it, military aircraft, European-trained army units, and the most modern weapons to white minority administrations not only in Angola and Mozambique, but also in Southern Rhodesia and in South Africa itself. In view of increasing police, diplomatic and military cooperation among these governments, the shadow of a far greater crisis is now gathering over the whole of southern Africa. If and when that crisis comes, Angola and its peoples may well be involved in a world emergency, upon which its future will finally depend. But, despite European influences, that Angola will ultimately assert its fundamentally African character can never be doubted.

Keith Irvine, a specialist in African affairs, has over the past decade contributed articles to a wide variety of publications. He was formerly editor of *Africa Today* and *Africa Weekly*, which has suspended publication.

²⁰ "Economic and Social Consequences of Racial Discriminatory Practices." (1963).

“... the Nigerian presence in world affairs is both the counterpart and extension of its internal position, which in turn has been influenced by the country's foreign policy,” writes this specialist. He sees Nigerian foreign policy as “a consistent extension of a pluralistic and democratic internal structure and system which gives priority to economic development as a means of building internal political cohesion and a Nigerian nationality, and which accepts the philosophical principle of ‘unity in diversity.’”

Nigeria: A Unique Nation

By ARNOLD RIVKIN

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IN THE three years of its existence the Federation of Nigeria, notwithstanding some very troubled times, has kept intact its federal governmental structure and its democratic political system. Both achievements, in light of the trends engulfing most of the African continent, have made Nigeria unique among the new states of Africa.¹

The Federation of Nigeria is the only federal state that has survived in Africa with the exception of the Federal Republic of Cameroon.

Significantly Nigeria is the only state in Africa to date to come to independence as a single unit with a fully operating federal system, chosen by the democratically elected political leadership of the country and successfully negotiated by them with Great Britain before independence. The structure was not determined by the United Nations or imposed by the colonial power or negotiated among independent or near-independent states. It

was the considered decision of the leadership of three regions administered by the United Kingdom collectively as Nigeria. The leadership of each region decided, after weighing the merits of the case, to adopt federalism as the only means under which independence could be achieved by Nigeria, as a single political entity. The likelihood is that Nigeria would not have come into existence within its present boundaries, *i.e.*, its former colonial boundaries, if agreement had not been reached on a federal structure. Two or more states would probably have emerged and the timing of their independence, at least for one of the new states, would possibly have been delayed.

The rationale underlying the choice of federation before independence continues to exist and appears, if anything, to have gained strength with the passage of time. It is this rationale which makes the outlook for the continuation of the federation a promising one.

First, the three regions recognized their cultural, social, religious, ethnic, linguistic, political and economic differences. Only a structure which recognized this pluralism could, as the Nigerians say, achieve “unity amidst diversity.”

Second, the three regions recognized their

¹ Although much of the factual material in this paper reflects recent events, the basic framework of the paper and underlying concepts, themes, interpretations, and assessments of the paper are drawn from the author's recent book, *The African Presence in World Affairs: National Development and Its Role in Foreign Policy* (Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), which was written while the author was Director of African Economic and Political Research at M.I.T.'s Center for International Studies (1957-1962).

economic interdependence. The landlocked Northern Region needed the ports of Apapa and Port Harcourt, in the Western and Eastern Regions respectively, to accommodate its exports and imports. The Niger and Benue Rivers, the railroad, the road system, and the air network all tended to emphasize the interlocking nature of the transportation grid of the country. The value of the economic diversity achieved by putting together Western Region cocoa, palm kernels and rubber, Northern Region groundnuts, cattle and tin, and Eastern Region palm oil and kernels, and coal, had been demonstrated during the colonial period. This complementarity of resources has been reinforced since independence by the commercial production of oil in the Eastern Region, with the discovery of natural gas, and the discovery of additional oil and natural gas deposits in the Western Region. Similarly, the importance of the large market constituted by a single political unit, with a population estimated at between 35 and 40 million people, in providing a base for industrial development and in attracting foreign private investment was not lost on the Nigerian leadership. The post-independence experience, although still not conclusive, suggests that this judgment will hold.

Third, the desire to play a major role in African affairs, and beyond, had its attraction for many Nigerian leaders; size, population, wealth, and so forth, would all obviously be relevant factors in making such a role possible. Nigeria's role in African affairs has been a major one, starting with the Monrovia Conference of May, 1961, which led up to the Addis Ababa Conference of May, 1963, and the triumph of the Nigerian position calling for economic, cultural, scientific, social and political cooperation among African states. Nigeria opposes the Pan-African goal of immediate political union, without prior forging of all the links Nigeria believes essential before even considering political union.

Finally, and by no means last in importance, a series of unifying factors carrying over in

various degrees from the colonial period—common language, similar university education, similar concepts and practices of modern jurisprudence, a common system of administration, a common currency, an expanding market system, a uniform system of weights and measures, a telecommunications system, and one could go on—have all tended to tie together the three regions formally constituted as Nigerian. As a result of this easy communication, Ibos tribesmen from the Eastern Region, with their considerable mobility, have for years helped staff the public service of the Northern Region (although this practice is now being discouraged by the Northern Region policy of "Northernization"). Then, too, the even more mobile Hausa traders from the Northern Region have carried their wares far and wide throughout the Western and Eastern Regions. Moreover, the federal capital of Lagos, formerly part of the Western Region, has become a microcosm of the ethnic composition of the country—with large populations of Western Region Yorubas and Eastern Region Ibos, but also not without smaller populations from many of the other Nigerian tribes.

COMMON BACKGROUND

The Nigerian federal structure is thus built on a solid foundation of shared common interests, traditions and experience. The three years of independence, including the launching of Nigeria's first post-independence economic development plan, have if anything deepened and broadened the common interests, enhanced the common traditions and enlarged the common experience.² This does not mean that there have not been problems. On the contrary, there have been serious problems, but, and this seems to be the important thing, they have been handled constitutionally within the existing federal framework. For example, although economic planning and development as such are within the scope of power of the three Regions for regional matters, and the Federal Government for federal functions and for the federal district of Lagos, the Federal Government was able with the cooperation of the Regions

² See "Nigeria's National Development Plan" in *Current History*, Vol. 43, No. 256 (December, 1962).

to develop a National Framework for Development within which the four development plans of the Regions and the Federal Government are, for the first time, correlated and coordinated. Similarly, the National Economic Council, a national machinery for consultation and coordination of the development plans and other economic policy, has been established. All four governments participate. In the same vein, although agriculture and primary and secondary education are regional functions, through a system of federal grants and grants-in-aid the Federal Government has been able to play an important national coordinating and financing role. In a different vein, but of striking importance, is the fact that a fourth region is about to be constituted out of the present Western Region in accordance with existing constitutional provisions and procedures, involving a complicated series of steps to safeguard all concerned against the capricious constitution of new regions. The new region—the Midwest Region—is to come into being by the end of this year. Also, in the constitutional field, as the result of the political agreement of the leadership of the three regions, the relevant constitutional provisions are likely to be invoked before the end of 1963, thus transforming Nigeria into a republic. At present Nigeria is a dominion in the Commonwealth under Queen Elizabeth.

THE DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM

The ability of the Federation of Nigeria to evolve institutions and techniques, on the one hand, and to undergo basic constitutional development, on the other, suggests that the Nigerians have found a way to adapt their complicated federal structure to their needs and make their federation responsive to the imperatives of their political and economic development. Thus, for Nigeria, federalism has served as an apt footing for the evolution and operation of a democratic political system.

Nigeria's state structure stands out in bold relief in the African context; so too does its political system. Despite the disappointment and resentment of those, and there are sur-

prisingly many, who cannot understand Nigeria's determination to create and operate a democratic system successfully—in sharp contrast to the authoritarian systems adopted so widely elsewhere on the continent as “necessary” or “inevitable” or “better suited” or “consistent with traditional practices” or “all that can be expected” or even “desirable”—Nigeria has so far, in the face of formidable obstacles, and not without stresses, strains and blemishes, successfully launched a democratic political system. Can it continue to sustain it?

The answer, of course, is not easy. There have been proposals in responsible quarters for a “national front” of political parties which sound not unlike the *parti unifié* of French-speaking African areas. These are amalgamations of all parties into a national grouping which over time becomes indistinguishable from the *parti unique* or a one-party system pure and simple. So far nothing has come of these proposals.

The government's 1962 census fiasco has not been reassuring. What should have been an objective technical population study became a political storm-center when leaks about the results suggested a potential shift in the internal political balance of power, as a result of a reported sharp increase in population in the Eastern Region. Rumor had it that the dominant Northern Region would no longer have a majority of the population, and hence no longer an automatic majority of seats in the lower house of Parliament. The census has not been published. It has on the contrary been withdrawn on the ground of technical faults and errors and is now to be redone at considerable cost. The decision was a joint one of the Federal Prime Minister and the three Regional Premiers. Irrespective of the accuracy of the rumors, the total performance has left a residue of political uneasiness and uncertainty.

There has also been the “emergency” in the Western Region, an emergency which ended early this year after about six months' duration. In brief outline, the affair started with a struggle for power within the controlling party in the Region, the Action Group, between a faction led by the party chairman,

and leader of the opposition in the Federal Parliament, Chief Awolowo, and a faction led by the Premier of the Western Region, Chief Akintola. As a result of an attempt by the Awolowo faction to unseat Akintola as Premier, a parliamentary session was disrupted and violence broke out. The Federal Prime Minister declared a state of emergency, superseded the Parliament and appointed an Administrator to run the regional government for about six months.

The emergency ended at the beginning of this year with a new coalition government assuming office, headed by Chief Akintola, chairman of a new party, the United Peoples' Party, and the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens, the controlling party in the Eastern Region and theretofore the opposition party in the Western Region. (In July of this year a "merger" of the United Peoples' Party and the Action Group, the two former wings of the old Action Group, was announced, and subsequently, amidst a welter of conflicting allegations, denied. Rumors persist and the ultimate fate of the projected merger is not clear at the date of this writing.)

Among the more striking aspects of the emergency are: 1. the performance of the federal government, which declared the state of emergency and superseded the Western Region government and then terminated the state of emergency in accordance with its public declaration to do so at a specified time without prolonging it on one or another pretext; 2. the fact that *all* parties to the dispute have had recourse to the courts, and not to violence, and have been willing to abide by court decisions; and, 3. the fact that throughout the governmental crisis the rule of law has been respected. This is not to say that there have not been disconcerting aspects, including the judgment to declare the state of emergency in the given circumstances, the obvious political maneuvering involved, and the worrisome precedent established for federal intrusion in regional political affairs.

There has also been the Coker Commission inquiry into corruption in public agencies and corporations in the Western Region. The evidence and final report of the proceedings

do not make pleasant reading. Obviously the scope and commonplace nature of the corruption revealed by the inquiry expose a lack of integrity which could jeopardize the political system. Two rays of light emerge from the inquiry: the inferences can be drawn that, by and large, the established career public service in the Western Region was not corrupted by its political chiefs; and that the Nigerian political system is open enough and resilient enough to hold a public inquiry of this type and apparently absorb its public revelations.

Finally, there are the current criminal trials of Chief Awolowo and a group of associates in the Action Group, and of Chief Enaharo, who after a long court struggle was extradited from England for conspiracy to overthrow the government by force. Both cases are *sub judice* as this is written and therefore judgments about them would not be appropriate. What can be said is that once again the rule of law has been much in evidence. The defendants have had the benefit of defense counsel, the right of cross-examination of witnesses, access to the evidence, and the other judicial and procedural safeguards to be found in a developed system of law in a democratic society. Comparisons between these two trials and trials in other African countries on similar charges are not at all unfavorable to Nigeria. The court hearing the cases is not a military one or a special tribunal constituted for "treason trials"; newspapers have not tried the cases in advance; the verdict is not preordained; appeals can be taken to higher courts; and the possible penalties are not capital in nature.

THE RULE OF LAW

Thus, the Nigerian political system has had its trials and tribulations. However, the system has not given way before the current African trend toward one-party systems; and the rule of law, although severely tested, pushed and pulled, remains intact. Chike Obi, head of the Dynamic party, and initially one of the defendants in the first conspiracy trial along with Chief Awolowo, was set free by the court for lack of evidence against him,

as were a group of others. The release of Chike Obi is particularly notable in that he has been an especially bothersome critic of the federal and Eastern Region governments, particularly on the touchy issue of corruption.

The test of the survival of the democratic system in Nigeria will come, in the first instance, with the advent of new elections in the Western Region, where the present post-emergency government labors under the cloud of having been put together during the emergency, without a specific electoral mandate; and, in the second instance, with the next federal elections, probably in 1964. If both these elections go off fairly without violence and after a campaign on the issues *between* and *among* the parties, then the Nigerian democratic political system would appear to be solidly rooted in Nigerian life.

Notwithstanding the political crises just discussed, Nigeria continues to have one of the very few free presses and one of the very few non-state controlled trade union movements on the continent; it is also one of the very few states in Africa without a preventive detention act in operation, one of the very few states on the continent where organized political activity is not the monopoly of one government party, and one of the very few states in Africa where economic development tends, in fact as well as precept, to be a priority concern of government.

Thus, although not without uncertainties, on balance the prospects seem reasonably good for the survival and growth of the Nigerian democratic political system along with its federal state structure. The two, system and structure, appear to reinforce one another.

NIGERIA IN WORLD AFFAIRS

Nigeria's leadership role in African affairs has already been alluded to briefly. Nigeria in intra-African affairs reflects her internal development pattern. Nigeria has been instrumental in founding the Monrovia bloc of 20 African states, which has emphasized internal development; respect for the independence and territorial integrity of all African states irrespective of size and wealth;

social, cultural, economic, scientific and political cooperation among African states; and decisions on international issues on their merits. The Monrovia bloc has opposed subversion by one African state of the government of another; has argued against immediate political union of African states as the indispensable precondition for political, economic and other collaboration among African states; and has refused to make decisions on international issues in keeping with membership in a particular bloc or grouping of states. Both the positive and negative components of Nigeria's intra-African policies are not only compatible with but are also logical extensions of its internal political structure and system based on the principle of pluralism in human and governmental relationships.

THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

In May, 1963, the Addis Ababa summit conference of heads of states and governments, attended by 31 independent African states, established the Organization of African Unity. The Charter of the new organization has been hailed as a synthesis of the charters of the two principal African blocs, the Monrovia bloc, already alluded to, and the Casablanca bloc of six states led in large part by Ghana. In fact, the Charter more or less records the collapse of the Casablanca bloc, but by no means the disappearance of states adhering to the Casablanca point of view. The bloc was already in serious disarray before the Addis Ababa Conference, and the formal adoption of the Monrovia bloc principles. A brief quote from the address of Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Prime Minister of Nigeria, delivered to the Conference before the adoption of the Charter but clearly anticipating the result, demonstrates the major role of Nigeria in the historic assemblage:

As I have said, we have to start from the beginning. I have listened to speeches in this Conference, and there have been only a very few members who spoke on the desirability of having a political union. Almost all the speeches indicate that a more practical approach is much preferred by the majority of the delegations. I am glad to say that the stand we have taken

right from the beginning is the stand of nearly all the countries in the Conference.³

The Prime Minister could have said the same thing about almost every stand "taken right from the beginning" by Nigeria and outlined in his address. In fact, his address reads like a rehearsal of the positions later adopted in the Charter of the new organization.

On the extra-African scene, Nigeria has been an active member of the Commonwealth. She played a leading role in forcing the withdrawal of the Union of South Africa from the Commonwealth on the apartheid issue. Nigeria has been critical of the European Economic Community with respect to the association of African states and after some equivocation has stated that she would not join the 18 African states, mostly of *l'expression française*, who hold associate membership in the Common Market. When the United Kingdom was negotiating for E.E.C. membership Nigeria did not oppose British entry into the Common Market, but declared her own unwillingness to become an associate member, and sounded a warning on Common Market trade discrimination which might be further aggravated by British membership.

In the United Nations, Nigeria has been an active member. The head of her permanent delegation, Chief S. O. Adebó, played an important role as chairman of the *ad hoc* committee concerned with finding a formula for the payment of special assessments by United Nations members, especially for the operation of "peace-keeping forces" of the type now in the Congo and the Near East. Nigeria is deeply committed to the United Nations as an institution.

Finally, Sir Abubakar's recommendation in his address to the Addis Ababa Conference calling for the establishment of "a permanent secretariat with a small full-time staff for an African committee or group representing member states who can take more effective action on matters affecting African interest at the United Nations" characterizes, better than scores of words, Nigeria's own concep-

tion of its role at the United Nations, and more generally in world affairs—more emphasis on practical action to translate principles and interests into operational reality.

Thus the Nigerian presence in world affairs is both the counterpart and extension of its internal position, which in turn has been influenced by the country's foreign policy.

Nigeria's foreign policy emphasizes economic, cultural, social and political cooperation among African states and rejects political union and merger of African states at this juncture in African history; Nigeria seeks to maintain loose but important Commonwealth ties, and places a strong reliance on practical action by the United Nations. This policy is a consistent extension of a pluralistic and democratic internal structure and system which gives priority to economic development as a means of building internal political cohesion and a Nigerian nationality, and which accepts the philosophical principle of "unity in diversity." The link between Nigeria's internal position and its external policy was clearly made by the Prime Minister in a recent report on the Addis Ababa Conference. Sir Abubakar said:

Just as we in Nigeria have been laying down one stone after another in the process of nation-building, thus ensuring that a solid foundation is laid; just as we are determined to preserve our unity in diversity; so the Addis Ababa Conference concentrated in those fields where the links between our states can be reinforced and strengthened and where new links can be forged while recognizing the fact that *unity should not be tantamount to uniformity*.

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³ *Federal Nigeria*, Vol. VI, No. 5 (June-July, 1963), p. 6.

In the opinion of this observer, "there is little reason to question Ghana's viability and competence as a nation." He sees Ghana as "a defined society with a sense of national integrity that has largely checked the tribal and regional forces that threatened it before and after independence."

Ghana: A Charismatic Nation

By LIONEL TIGER

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ONE OF THE FEW internationalist-minded slogans written on the ubiquitous "mammy lorries" of Ghana is the firm wish: "*Let Them Say Ghana Sweet.*" The word "sweet" in its Ghanaian usage suggests an approval which is not in this case always forthcoming; Ghana is a controversial nation which accumulates warm friends and equally warm enemies. Just as its leader, Kwame Nkrumah, has been described as a "charismatic leader,"¹ Ghana itself might be regarded as a charismatic nation which attracts publicity and exerts influence beyond its apparent size and wealth.

Matters which interest outsiders are Ghana's attitude toward Pan-Africanism, its "positive neutrality" in the context of the broad East-West encounter, and what is viewed in some circles as the uncongenial "black dictatorship" of President Nkrumah. There is another major theme—Ghana's social and economic development—in many ways more interesting than the flashier issues which unfortunately obscure the substantial changes in daily life that signify Ghana's ambitious development program.

At the outset, a general phenomenon should be noted: because of its special place in African and international history, and possibly because of the nature of its culture, Ghanaian public affairs seem to be marked by flamboyance, by a sense of the extreme, by con-

fusing paradoxes which may connote a relatively incoherent and irresponsible polity. While the President is supposedly maneuvering for Pan-African leadership, bombs exploded outside his residence, and at public appearances, suggest domestic weakness. While austere international bankers are entertained by the Government, bestowing investments and loans, the Government-supervised press denounces the injustices of capitalism and rumbles darkly about the ease and efficacy of nationalization. Although Ghana's United Nations spokesmen orate on racial equality in Southern Africa, discussions of the "African Personality" excite fears among those who see in this concept a reflection of subtle but corrosive racialism.

Of course most nations will display apparent internal contradictions. But in Ghana's case, the sense of the extreme has flavored much of its recent history. The country is essentially coherent and pragmatic; yet it contrives to maintain rather extremist postures in important matters such as the scheduling and meaning of independence, the control of economy, and Pan-Africanism. It appears to do this because it assumes that, though there will be inevitable compromise, Ghana should state firmly an "idealistic" position, to keep ultimate ends clearly in view—perhaps to motivate and shame the fearful and the laggard.

Thus, in 1951, Nkrumah demanded "Self-Government Now," an initially impossible re-

¹ See David Apter, *Gold Coast in Transition*, Princeton, 1957.

quest insistently repeated for six years until independence was achieved in 1957. In that same year Nkrumah issued a demand for an end to colonialism, insisting on this immediately; six years later the Addis Ababa Conference of Heads of State required the same thing and prepared to back up their demands.

But despite any appearance of recklessness and instability, Ghana is a defined society with a sense of national integrity that has largely checked the tribal and regional forces that threatened it before and after independence. There is little reason to question Ghana's viability and competence as a nation. Its ability to adopt independent-minded policies reflects a forceful combination of internal administrative sophistication—the Civil Service has been described as the best in independent Africa—and political energy of considerable foresight and realism.

THE NEO-COLONIAL UMBILICUS

What other nations and commentators might consider "idealistic" African policies would, for Nkrumah and the Ghana government, constitute an essentially pragmatic stance. In fact they would argue that their idealism has been in the long run more sensitively attuned to the realities of modern African politics than the policies and less dramatic views of more apparently moderate countries.

This may underlie the periodic waves of hostility which Ghana and Nkrumah evoke from other governments. What may be at issue here is not that Ghana is wrong or intemperate, but that it is regarded as too painfully correct in its policies by citizens of other countries, so that for political reasons reluctant national politicians are urged to greater identification with Pan-African aims than they might *in vacuo* prefer. Since independence is brand-new for most African nations, it is to be expected that politicians who have finally achieved it are loathe to devolve some of their sovereignty to a supernational body, and will predictably resent Ghana's strident critique of a moderate position.

Ghana's style of Pan-Africanism implies also

a rejection of any special association between ex-colonies and their former governors. Nkrumah fears that African independence, based upon national boundaries drawn capriciously by European powers (and with African economies tied to specific European ones), may well prove illusory unless African unity becomes a reality. In his view, "neo-colonialism" disguised as independence prevails in countries "balkanized" by former masters and effectively prevents true independence. Reliance on the former colonists for investment capital, for canons of behavior and ethics and particularly for military assistance suggests to Nkrumah and his advisors that real independence is non-existent. His reiteration of this diagnosis, whatever its own merits, cannot fail to antagonize politicians of other nations on a personal as well as an official level. They are thus indirectly, but fundamentally, criticized and they feel the legitimacy of their leadership is questioned.

It may be imagined that those leaders of French-speaking territories who spend considerable time in the *Metropole*, and whose budgets and defense organizations are substantially supported by French assistance are particularly offended. Nkrumah may have had these leaders in mind, as well as proponents of regional groupings in Africa, when he spoke to the Ghanaian National Assembly on June 21, 1963:

... General de Gaulle is reported to have commented . . . that the Organization of African Unity which the independent African States envisage is "a federation of the various African regional groupings." . . . It is a matter of great interest to us to observe that this great European, now engrossed with his grand design for Europe, should feel such unsolicited concern for the future of Africa.

Regional groupings of any kind are a serious threat to the unity of Africa. . . . General de Gaulle knows quite well that if regional federalism . . . can be sold to a united Africa, the economic future of his Europe will be assured. Only by fomenting and nursing regional and sectional political groupings in Africa can the imperialists and ex-colonial powers be sure of retaining their rapidly waning influence in Africa.²

Nkrumah maintains that gradualism of any

² See also, Kwame Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*, Heinemann, London, 1963, Chap. 18.

kind, based either on prior regional associations, or on independent preparations for a final union, will only delay achievement of African unity and increase the difficulty of formulating a creative and agreeable basis of association.³

Conditions in the Congo and Southern Africa have crystallized Ghana's African policies. The relationship of property-owning groups in Europe and America to their governments' policies in the Congo and now Southern Africa have led the Ghana government to suspect, if not their good faith, at least the freedom of action of governments involved. Thus, if salutary change were to come in Southern Africa, if it were to be effected in the Congo, Ghana feels that either United Nations action would be necessary, or African states would have to take corrective measures in unity.⁴

THE SOUTH AFRICA PROBLEM

The South Africa issue is profoundly exasperating to the Ghana government. While it was once inclined to be moderate (having offered to exchange High Commissioners and having invited South Africa to the First Conference of Independent African States in Accra, 1958), the Government now feels that unified African endeavor may be the only means of modifying the bitterly resented *apartheid* situation. The United Kingdom's continued supply of arms to the South African government, purportedly for defense purposes only, appears to the Ghana government

an effort to maintain armament profits and British employment at the expense of the well-being and perhaps lives of Negro Africans.

Similarly, the fact that United States-made Nato weapons are allegedly used by the Portuguese in policing African territorial political movements stimulates immeasurable hostility to the cold war military alliances affecting Africa. The British government claims that Southern Rhodesian independence and the nature of the constitution that limits black participation in government are beyond the control of the United Kingdom. This claim impresses the Ghana government as a crude example of propertied reaction buttressed by racial insensitivity as well as an obeisance to South African interests;⁵ in this situation the Government may be expected to tout unified African action. And while the Government may appreciate the dangers in forcing the withdrawal of South Africa and Rhodesia from the United Nations, in terms of its long-run policy, it would regard this with a moral and tactical urgency perhaps comparable to the reasons behind the exclusion of China from the United Nations.

That Ghana's major international disagreements are with those Euro-American powers directly or indirectly involved with Africa does not necessarily imply anti-Westernism. Ghana's trade and major cultural and educational interests are still dominantly Western⁶ and, aside from the matter of white supremacy, what verbal anti-Western behavior Ghana exhibits may be regarded as symbolic neutralism.

But insofar as the cold war involves nuclear potential which could destroy Ghana, she is actively hostile—especially to any threat of such activity over what, from Accra, may seem merely a tribal squabble of the wealthy Euro-American societies. The expenditure of large sums of money on militaristic space and arms research is considered a more pernicious distortion of acceptable values, in view of the extent of poverty in the world, than any of the ideological, territorial and economic issues of the cold war. Ghana's view, for a while reflected only in the ephemeral "Casablanca Group,"⁷ is now broadly incorporated into the

³ *Address to Conference of African Heads of State and Government in Addis Ababa*, May 24, 1963, by Kwame Nkrumah.

⁴ Though at one point during the Congo crisis, the Ghana government hinted at African action independent of the United Nations, nonetheless it maintained full assistance to the Special Force as required. See Colin Legum, *Congo Disaster*, Penguin, London, 1962. Pp. 146–9.

⁵ See "Ghana Warns U.N. On Rhodesia Plan," *The New York Times*, Western Edition, September 10, 1963. Further, Ghana's resolution before the Security Council in September, 1963, calling on Britain not to "transfer" any governmental powers or armed forces to Southern Rhodesia was approved but subsequently vetoed by Britain.

⁶ See Adhemar Byl, "Ghana's Struggle for Economic Independence," *Current History*, December, 1962.

⁷ Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Morocco, and the United Arab Republic.

formal non-alignment of African states articulated in Article Three of the charter signed at Addis.

This non-alignment decision might have been considered improper in such Western-oriented nations as Nigeria and the Ivory Coast just a year ago. The fact that it now seems natural in the Pan-African context suggests that the aggressive "idealism" of Ghana and its like-minded colleagues has had substantial influence in altering Africa's view of the world power struggle. To achieve this, Ghana has entertained visitor after visitor from African territories, has sent missions abroad on one pretext or another, has supported Pan-African organizations where it can, and has invested heavily in formal diplomacy. Ghana now supports 44 diplomatic missions including 19 in Africa. More are planned. The government has clearly elected to commit itself to an ambitious diplomatic program.⁸

Ghana remains a member of the Commonwealth of Nations, which is regarded as a useful informal facility for international politics. However, Ghana does not consider the Commonwealth a "Western" or ideologically committed body. This was apparent after British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's offer of support to India during the Sino-Indian border crisis. Corresponding with Macmillan at the time, Nkrumah noted in his letter of November 1, 1962:

... What distressed me was your statement that the British Government would give India every support. This appeared to be ... dangerously prejudging the issue and shutting the door in the face of any possible mediation or negotiation. The Commonwealth is not a military alliance and it would be most detrimental to its progress if the impression were created that Commonwealth members did not judge each issue independently ... but automatically sided with a fellow Commonwealth country. ...

Nkrumah also noted that because of China's exclusion from the United Nations, the best agency for arbitration, it was essential that

nations with diplomatic relations with both India and China be "determined not to prejudge the issue."

THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET

An important set-back for Ghana's African policies was the agreement of African nations to participate in the "Council of Associated States" in cooperation with members of the European Economic Community. Ghana and Nigeria had argued that association would perpetuate a neo-colonial economic inferiority because the traditional flow of raw goods to Europe and manufactured goods to Africa would be unchanged. Ghana supported an African common market which would, it suggested, stimulate local economies to produce a wider range of goods and services for African export. Here it drew on the United States and Russian examples of political consolidation of continental territory as a basis for successful industrialization.⁹

It had been speculated as early as 1961 that if the policies of the E.E.C. and the associated territories were "not oriented in a way which would take advantage of the existence of a large and sheltered market in order to speed up economic development then the close association with the community is likely to become an additional factor which would tend to perpetuate the existing production patterns and to slow down the introduction of energetic measures aimed at industrialization."¹⁰ The Government has felt that African association with the E.E.C. constitutes a long-run barrier to increased African trade, and as such, this recent development represents a defeat for one of the Government's major policy efforts.

In 1961, Ghana's exports to African states were only 2.8 per cent of its total exports. This created practical as well as idealistic reasons for protecting the potential of its rapidly-expanding industrial plants from formal tariff barriers erected by Associated nations. This is relevant in the short-run as well: "The fact that all Ghana exports are primary raw materials is mainly responsible for the continuous deterioration of Ghana's export position."¹¹

⁸ See *Ghana Today*, London, July 31, 1963.

⁹ See Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*, Chap. 20.

¹⁰ Ghana Government, *Economic Survey*, 1961, p. 17.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

That Ghana's foreign policies have been as consistent and insistent as they have been is more noteworthy against the background of the internal difficulties that the Government and Nkrumah have had to face since independence. A series of attempts on the President's life, the subsequent apprehension of the Foreign Minister, Ako Adjei, and another leading minister, Tawia Adamafio, and several others, the public treason trials in Accra—all have contributed tension and sour mystery to the local political scene.

PLOT AGAINST NKRUMAH

The plot against Nkrumah has its roots in 1961, when an austerity budget was introduced and was followed by popular demonstrations and internal political struggle. The background of this budget is significant, because it indicated a shift of control of budgetary and financial matters from a political minister to a group of technically-skilled civil servants operating in secretariats under the President's very general supervision. Earlier there had been a tendency for important functions of government (such as planning, financial control, scholarship allotment, publicity, the Volta River Project, statistics) to find their way into the President's office under the day-to-day supervision of civil servants. This trend continued. Increasing administrative influence resided in the Office of the President, and politicians' importance declined correspondingly.

This process was catalyzed by Ghana's assumption of a republican form of government in 1960 which created in the Office of the President a strong executive somewhat on the United States pattern. Nkrumah's 1960 visit to Washington reinforced the centralizing, bureaucratizing tendency in Ghanaian administration. Following the "Dawn Broadcast" on April 8, 1961, in which Kwame Nkrumah severely and, for the first time, openly chastised deficient and corrupt politicians, the morale and authority of the civil service perceptibly increased, at the expense of less soberminded politicians.

Nkrumah's concern with foreign affairs, particularly the Congo crisis, and his involvement with economic development administration provided an opportunity for Tawia Adamafio allegedly to create his own local political empire. This was an extraordinarily intense and ambitious program considering that Adamafio had been, until 1953, a political enemy of the Convention People's Party (C.P.P.) and had afterwards carried on his organizing from London where he was a student until 1960. He was made General Secretary of the Party for a short period. An elaborate build-up of personal influence followed and other claimants to power were out-manuevered. Then Adamafio and some colleagues allegedly conspired with members of an anti-Government tribal group resident in Accra—traditionally antipathetic to what was regarded as unfair occupancy of their land by foreigners—to assassinate the President. The brief of the Attorney General to the Special Court hearing the open trial offered a variety of evidence to link the accused to the crimes;¹² at the time of writing, the case is in process.

From available evidence, Nkrumah's political position appears secure. There is no Ghanaian of comparable stature who would be widely regarded as a more effective leader of Ghana. The assassination attempts reflect a small group of disloyal and irresponsible individuals, interested more in power than policy, rather than a substantial ground swell of hostility to Nkrumah. If anything, Nkrumah's position has been buttressed by a public sympathy for political martyrdom, a feeling which made the "Prison Graduate" (the patriot who served time in a colonial prison for agitation) an important figure in the national mythology.

While there is undoubted opposition to Nkrumah and his Government on policy, it is largely confined to wrangling between generations and within the party. The C.P.P. is not a monolithic structure intolerant of criticism. The existence of gross subversion so close to the center of power unchecked for so long suggests that the Party is unlike the totalitarian systems often associated with one

¹² See *Ghana Times*, Accra August 10, 1963.

party states. While some may disagree with the one party pattern, there is no apparent general Ghanaian antipathy in principle to the system at the present time.¹³

It is known that in 1961 leaders of the United (Opposition) Party were asked to merge with the C.P.P. for a defined period in an effort to create a form of political arbitration which would not depend on a formal opposition party. The U.P. refused, and various measures followed which limited the official importance of the formal opposition.

But though there is no formal opposition to the government,

. . . civil servants in Ghana, however senior, judges, and officers of the armed forces, are not dependent on party favor for appointment and promotion as they are in Guinea or Senegal, even if their loyalty must be unquestioned. In Ghana . . . non-party as opposed to anti-party activity is recognized as valuable.¹⁴

While the ultimate test of Ghanaian political arrangements may come with the need for a successor to the President,¹⁵ the political behavior of Ghanaians suggests that they believe they are creating political forms appropriate to their situation and history; as they see it, under the general description of "African socialism," an energetic process of eclecticism and creation is under way.

Ghana has been marked by definite and widely approved social change under the present government. Development has been visible. Paramount has been the Volta River Project now under construction, a year ahead of schedule; this power and aluminum proj-

ect has economic significance; as a massive industrial undertaking it also concretely symbolizes Ghana's participation in the basic processes of modern society. Other industrial activities have been introduced; more are planned. These will curtail spending abroad for manufactured goods and the new skills and attitudes will have broad long-range influences on Ghanaian society. The confidence and sense of activity which the development projects impart are at least as important as concrete economic benefits. Agricultural development as well, heretofore neglected, has finally been given appropriate emphasis in a nation still largely agricultural.

Educational facilities have been widely expanded. Primary school enrollment in 1951 was 154,360; in 1963 enrollment is 789,428. Free textbooks were to be provided by the regime as of October, 1963. Secondary school attendance has increased ten-fold in the same period. The University of Ghana and other institutions of higher learning have radically accelerated the pace of instruction.¹⁶

A community development and self-help program which has attracted wide interest continues to channel local enthusiasms for the development process into school buildings, nurseries, roads and hospitals. The Government supplies material and technical guidance and local areas supply voluntary labor. At this level politicians function strategically, in cooperation with civil servants, to assimilate popular moods and wishes into the over-all program of providing desired facilities.

Through its development programs, its assertive international stance, and its functional internal political arrangements, Ghana has maintained its early position, practically, and symbolically, as a significant nation.

¹³ See David Williams, "Commonwealth West Africa," *African Independence* (ed. Peter Judd), Dell, N. Y., 1962.

¹⁴ See *West Africa*, London, June 22, 1963.

¹⁵ An experienced observer of Ghanaian politics, Dennis Austin, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London, has suggested in private communication that there were likely to be few destructive consequences of any struggle for succession because "Ghana is an established state well understood to be so by its inhabitants" and because any struggle would occur within Accra, generally recognized as the proper capital of the country. Once reasonably established, the authority there is likely to be regarded as legitimate.

¹⁶ *Report of the Commission on University Education*, Accra, 1961. See also Government's *White Paper* #5/61.

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Discussing events since June, 1962, leading to the final capitulation of secessionist Katanga Province, this historian outlines the many obstacles to unification of the Congo. He writes that "despite the settlement made last January with Tshombe, one cannot say that the country is really united."

Aftermath in the Congo

By HARRY R. RUDIN

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AFTER THE failure of direct negotiations between Premier Cyrille Adoula of the central Congolese government and Moïse Tshombe of Katanga in June, 1962, a plan for ending Katanga's secession was worked out by the United States. Later, the United States plan was adopted by the United Nations; Secretary General U Thant announced it on August 20, 1962.

The plan provided that the central government and Katanga would have equal shares in the rebel province's revenues from taxes, duties and mining royalties. The armies of the two regions were to be merged into a single national Congolese army. A monetary council for the control of foreign exchange was to be established. The plan also asked experts appointed by the United Nations to draft a constitution for the united Congo, to replace the Belgian-drafted *loi fondamentale*, which had served as a constitution ever since independence.

Acting under this mandate, legal experts of the United Nations drafted a new constitution. Instead of the six provinces in the Congo it was proposed to have 21, with the central government having a large measure of control. The constitution empowered the president to declare an emergency, even to suspend the constitution. In the summer of 1962, Katanga was actually divided into two provinces, North Katanga and South Katanga, to weaken Tshombe's powers.

Adoula accepted the United Nations plan

on August 26, 1962. Tshombe waited, however, until September 4, when he agreed to the principles of the proposal just in time to avoid a virtual ultimatum from U Thant. The plan provided for sanctions against Tshombe if he did not cooperate; consuming nations would be asked to stop their purchases of Katanga's copper and cobalt, the chief sources of Katanga's revenues. Should this boycott fail the United Nations could resort to the use of force to end Katanga's secession.

U Thant's plan did not have the approval of all members of the United Nations. The Soviet Union and its satellites had not been consulted when the plan was drafted; they naturally objected to it, just as they had objected to the presence of United Nations forces in the Congo. Great Britain, France, Belgium and other states objected; they had no intention of applying force to compel Tshombe's adherence to the proposals and to the reintegration of Katanga into a united Congolese republic. Several countries, notably the Soviet Union, France, Belgium, South Africa and others, persistently refused to pay the contributions assessed by the United Nations for the cost of United Nations forces in the Congo.

The situation was one that Tshombe felt he could exploit. In preparation for the fight to come, he strengthened his economic and military position by tightening his control over the Union Minière and its funds, by hiring white mercenaries, by increasing the size and

improving the training of his army far beyond its numbers and quality in 1960, and by acquiring an air force of 50 planes to overcome his earlier military weakness *vis-à-vis* the United Nations.

Disagreement in the United Nations encouraged Tshombe. He also found comfort in the problems that confronted Adoula, who had to face serious parliamentary criticism throughout 1962. Late in the year the premier was forced to reduce his cabinet from 42 ministers to 25 in an effort to reduce the costs of government and to eliminate some of the deficit causing ruinous inflation in the country. The unemployed thousands in Leopoldville became so serious a threat that Adoula had to declare a state of emergency. He survived a censure motion in parliament at the end of November only by a narrow margin.

KATANGA'S RESISTANCE

This predicament of Adoula, the division of opinion among leading members of the United Nations, and the possession of a strong army and air force may well explain Tshombe's refusal to end Katanga's secession and to become a part of the government in Leopoldville despite pressure from U Thant and from the United States in favor of the United Nations plan. Tshombe believed he could avoid giving effect to the plan by offering a part of Katanga's revenue to the financially hard-pressed government of Adoula. It was only natural for Adoula, for U Thant, and for the United States to come to the conviction that time was running out and that the reunification of the Congo could not be put off any longer.

The United States sent a military mission under General Louis Truman to the Congo to study the needs of the United Nations forces, most of them already stationed in Katanga. That mission was the occasion of serious anti-American demonstrations in Elisabethville, Katanga's capital, as well as the target of Soviet criticism in the United Nations. Both Adoula and U Thant called for the application of economic sanctions against Tshombe.

The determination of both parties in this

controversy not to yield led to the outbreak of fighting in Elisabethville in December, 1962. U.N. forces then decided to clear road-blocks that denied to the international army that freedom of movement which had been arranged in August, 1960, between the Secretary General of the United Nations and the government of the Congo. Before the end of December, United Nations troops had captured Tshombe's palace, the headquarters of Katanga's gendarmerie, the radio station, the National Bank of Katanga, and other places of varying strategic value. Control of the capital city was complete. The Katanganese air force was quickly eliminated by the Swedes in their jets.

Fearing arrest, Tshombe fled to Salisbury for protection and for consultation with Sir Roy Welensky, premier of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. At the time of his departure he threatened to adopt a scorched-earth policy to prevent more United Nations conquests. This sudden outbreak of fighting shocked some observers. The British had been very critical of the United Nations' use of force against Tshombe. The Soviet Union protested and demanded the immediate withdrawal of United Nations troops, for whose support it had contributed nothing.

U.N. ULTIMATUM

On the last day of 1962, an ultimatum from United Nations authorities gave Tshombe two weeks in which to end the secession of Katanga. Tshombe replied that he was willing to return to Elisabethville to negotiate an end of secession. Robert Gardiner, the United Nations' chief representative in the Congo, cautioned against the mistake of stopping too short. Contrary to instructions, it is said, United Nations troops moved against Jadotville instead of waiting in Elisabethville to give Tshombe a chance to submit to the ultimatum. This military move resulted in the accidental shooting of two civilians by the troops. Nonetheless, United Nations Under Secretary Ralph Bunche gave the green light for further military operations against Tshombe.

Tshombe called on his people to prepare for total war and again he talked of adopting

a scorched-earth policy. When Tshombe returned to Elisabethville on January 7, 1963, saying that he was ready to make a peace settlement, Bunche refused to see him and declared that the time for negotiation of a settlement was over.

By order of U Thant, Tshombe was first placed under house arrest, then mysteriously released to guide a column of United Nations troops into a peaceful occupation of the territory between Elisabethville and the Rhodesian border. Thereupon Tshombe suddenly disappeared again, to give rise to rumors that he had gone to Kolwezi to prepare for a last-ditch stand. Bridges on the way to Kolwezi were destroyed to hamper the movement of United Nations troops. Tshombe talked of blowing up installations of the Union Minière in Kolwezi, where explosives were already *in situ* for the operation.

CAPITULATION

Then in mid-January, with that gift he has for sudden and most unexpected decision, Tshombe capitulated and declared himself ready to cooperate with the United Nations. He offered to return to Elisabethville and to work out the terms for ending secession. It was reported that a Belgian consul in Southern Rhodesia had persuaded him to surrender; another report at the time stated that United States President John Kennedy had urged Adoula to accept Tshombe's peace offer with the United Nations and with the central Congolese government. Tshombe insisted on amnesty for himself and his followers, especially for the white mercenaries, whom he now paid off.

Tshombe was permitted to retain an armed bodyguard and to have complete freedom of movement in the country. The United Nations insisted that Tshombe's gendarmes surrender their weapons and become members of the central government's army. After the settlement was made, Tshombe, at some risk to himself, led United Nations forces into Kolwezi to persuade his followers to yield without fighting and to remove the explosives that were to be used to demolish bridges and buildings.

PROBLEMS OF UNIFICATION

With secession at an end it became necessary to create a reunited Congo. Although the victors in the fight against Tshombe felt that chaos and anarchy were now at an end, they were to find themselves confronted by overwhelming economic and political problems. Joseph Ileo, premier in Leopoldville in 1960, was sent to Katanga to work out the details of the province's amalgamation with the rest of the country. Having fulfilled the United Nations's goal of ending the secession of Katanga, U Thant now turned to other problems. One of the first tasks would be to reduce the size of the United Nations forces in the Congo. The mandate for their presence in the Congo would end on June 30; beyond that date there were no funds for carrying on. The United States also favored a reduction of United Nations forces. It was believed that the army of the central government would be able to maintain law and order.

The cost of living was reported to have gone up 80 per cent during 1962, 50 per cent since November, 1962. There was need of economic assistance. U Thant began working immediately on an enlarged program of technical assistance. At the same time the United States sent one of its highest officials to the Congo to study the situation and to report the Congo's needs.

The years of fighting in the Congo had made most of its problems much worse than they were in 1960, certainly in economic matters. Fighting had resulted in the destruction of roads, railroads, bridges, mines, and so forth.

The population of Leopoldville has more than doubled during the last three years. Many of the newcomers into the crowded city are Bangalas, whose presence is resented by the local Bakongo. The latter have even tried to bar food from the city in order to force these new arrivals out. By April, 1963, over 200,000 unemployed people were to be found in the capital city, most of them newcomers. The United States sent surplus flour, butter and dried milk to help the needy, only to see much of this food smuggled across the

river to Brazzaville, where it brings in more Congolese francs. Hundreds of American trucks were delivered by the United States to help with the distribution of food; they seem to have been given to political favorites. The American representative in the Congo has said that no more trucks will be delivered until each of the first shipment of a thousand trucks is located and its owner known.

Smuggling was profitable in the east as well as in the west. Under arrangements made by the Congolese government with Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda, eastern areas of the Congo could import goods duty free through ports on the Indian Ocean and have them transported duty free across the territories of former British East Africa. It is said that these goods had a value of about \$1 million a month. Corrupt Congolese smuggled these goods back into the territories that had handled them free of duty. The East African territories have retaliated by refusing to admit and to transport any more duty-free goods for the Congo.

FISCAL PROBLEMS

The fiscal situation in the Congo has become a matter of serious concern. The 1962 budget provides for expenditures amounting to \$362 million and for doubtful revenues amounting to \$202 million. Not satisfied with a 50-50 split of Katanga's revenues, Adoula insists on getting 65 per cent. Much of the gold that Leopoldville had hoped to capture in Katanga had been sent out of the country; only a small part has been recovered.

Many people in critical positions in the Congo are far from satisfied with the treatment they have been getting. Thousands of teachers in the rural areas have been reported as having received no pay during the last year, and 35,000 of them have gone on strike. In April, 1962, an unsuccessful general strike was called by the country's largest trade union to force politicians to reduce their salaries and other perquisites of office. In May, 1963, 3,000 men in the police force in Leopoldville mutinied for an increase in pay, a move that the government believed to be a conspiracy aiming at its overthrow.

When government workers struck in August in Leopoldville, it was again said that the move aimed to overthrow Adoula. This time the army was called in to halt the demonstrations. During these public protests for higher pay, leaflets were distributed calling for the overthrow of Adoula's regime. The quick and successful rebellion against President Fulbert Youlou in the neighboring Congo Republic (Brazzaville) during the summer of 1963 naturally made Adoula nervous. One writer has said that the corruption within the government in Leopoldville is far worse than that which caused Youlou's ouster across the river. Adoula's numerous political opponents in parliament, in particular the followers of Lumumba, take advantage of these expressions of discontent to embarrass the premier.

Despite the settlement made last January with Tshombe, one cannot say that the country is really united. That work remains to be done. Many ancient tribal rivalries were intensified during the war and still plague Leopoldville. The fear persists that Tshombe will seek to regain power in Katanga. Only a small number of his gendarmes have surrendered their arms in accordance with the agreement of last January; and it is said that thousands of them roam about the country living by robbery and other violence. Efforts of the Congolese Army to disarm them have led to a number of bloody clashes. The central government charges that many of the white mercenaries and gendarmes who aided Tshombe are in Angola, where the Portuguese permit them to remain and to train. Relations between the Portuguese of Angola and the Congolese state have been in great tension as a consequence of Adoula's recognition of Roberto Holden's Angolan government in exile with headquarters in Leopoldville.

KATANGA'S FATE

In June, 1963, Tshombe left the country because he feared arrest. The central government had done everything possible to undermine his position in the weeks following the end of the secessionist war. As already stated, Adoula took 65 per cent of Katanga's

revenues. Katanga was split into two provinces in 1962. A further split occurred in May, 1963, when the country's twenty-second province was formed out of part of Tshombe's South Katanga and given the name of Lualaba. This new province contained Kolwezi, with its riches in copper and cobalt. The rest of South Katanga has been made into a twenty-third province. The central government has disarmed Tshombe's bodyguard; it has deprived him of Belgian advisers.

The secret police claim to have discovered documents involving Tshombe in correspondence with Communists and in preparing troops for action of some sort. These documents have not been published; the central government has been deterred by Tshombe's threat to retaliate by publishing documents implicating members of the central government in the 1961 murder of Lumumba. It is impossible to say that efforts to reconcile the Katanganese with the central regime have been successful. In September, 1963, in an interview in Spain, where he had gone for medical treatment, Tshombe complained of the treatment given Katanga; he threatened to return if conditions did not improve.

OTHER PROBLEMS

Other problems of reunification remain. In South Kasai, which seceded in 1960, the followers of Kalonji are still active and seek the return of their leader. Followers of Lumumba are also at work. For a brief time during the summer such a group gained control of the new province around Stanleyville until pressure from the central government forced its removal. Lumumbaists in parliament take advantage of local discontent in the hope of ousting Adoula from office.

It is indeed a serious question whether the government of Adoula can maintain itself. The lack of funds and attendant difficulties within the United Nations caused U Thant to say that all United Nations forces would be withdrawn from the Congo by the end of 1963. The sale of United Nations bonds financed the military operations in the Congo until June 30, 1963. By that time two-thirds

of the blue-helmeted army of about 20,000 had already left the country. Only with the greatest of difficulty, U Thant persuaded a special session of the General Assembly to permit the rest of the United Nations force to remain until the end of 1963. Over the protests of France, the Soviet Union and others, the Assembly voted \$33 million to support that force during the second half of this year. It seemed most unlikely that funds would be available beyond that time.

NEED FOR MILITARY FORCE

Since some military force is needed to maintain law and order, and since it appeared that the peace force of the United Nations could not be counted on, arrangements for the training of the Congolese army were to be made in a series of bilateral agreements between the central Congolese government and the United States, Canada, Norway, Belgium, Italy and Israel. In this way, the troublesome issue of United Nations financing would be avoided. The Soviet Union and other Communist states objected to a scheme under which Nato powers and Israel would be in virtual control of the Congo's army. African and Asian states objected also, partly because they had not been asked to participate in the program.

For various reasons the Congo government failed to make final arrangements with the states that were to assist in the training and equipping of its army. Furthermore, there were Congolese who did not want Belgian officers to come to the Congo to train local officers. More than an academic question arose when it was asked whether these Belgian officers would wear Congolese uniforms and be under the command of General Joseph Mobutu or whether they would have Belgian uniforms and serve under a Belgian command.

Fearing chaos, tribal war, and other threats to the pro-Western government of Leopoldville, Adoula, the United States, Great Britain, Belgium and other countries finally persuaded U Thant to keep United Nations forces of about 5,000 men in the Congo until June 30, 1964. Some African states supported this extension but only on the condition that

there be no further extensions after next June 30. President Kennedy is said to have influenced U Thant in September, 1963, by the argument that forces were necessary to protect the extraordinary gains in the Congo. The 32-nation African bloc was won over to the program. U Thant tried to get the General Assembly to settle the issue as quickly as possible. The Soviet Union and Poland objected, saying that the issue in question was a political one that came within the jurisdiction of the Security Council. Before the end of September top priority was given to the question of financing these forces in 1964. Since Adoula promised to contribute \$3.2 million, the United Nations had to find about \$14 million as its part of the costs. A large part of this would be borne by the United States.

PRESSURE FOR REFORM

The United Nations also had to curtail its plans for civilian aid to the Congo. In July, 1963, the United Nations insisted that economic reforms would have to precede the granting of further aid. At the same time 12 countries, including the United States, Belgium and others, insisted on reforms as an essential pre-condition to technical aid. Adoula was told that expenditures must be reduced, that new taxes were needed, that steps would have to be taken to protect the country's small reserves of hard currency, that government departments must abide by budget specifications. The United Nations talked about sending experts to supervise the collection of taxes and other necessary fiscal measures. In July, the United States actually reduced its aid to the Congo by about 50 per cent, eliminating in particular sums for the building of roads, airports, bridges and public buildings. It was said that the United States, as the greatest single benefactor of the Congo, was applying more pressure for reform than any other country.

U Thant appealed to United Nations members for voluntary contributions for civilian operations, explaining that, unless funds came in, the aid program would not survive the year. He said that \$4 million was needed merely to meet contractual obliga-

tions to the end of 1963. The failure of states to make contributions caused U Thant in early September to order a reduction in the technical assistance program. One can well understand why one writer asked whether the United Nations would withdraw completely from the Congo. It should be pointed out that Belgium has contributed a good deal in men and money to assist the Congo.

A DIFFICULT TASK

At long last the government is working on the new constitution, starting with the one drafted by the United Nations experts and with a second prepared by Tshombe. This new constitution would replace the *loi fondamentale*, which has served as a constitution for over three years. In late September, Adoula summoned the two houses of parliament to meet as one body in a constituent assembly. Adoula would like to have a constitution ready in time for the general elections due early in the summer of 1964. The premier's political opponents in parliament are making his task most difficult.

The summer of 1963 ended with the Congo facing very much the same serious problems confronting it in July, 1960, in the first days of independence. Separatism, tribal wars, financial problems, outside aid, the cold war—all these are present in more or less acute form after three years of independence and of fighting. One finds it hard to agree with U Thant's statement in his annual report to the United Nations that the territorial integrity of the country has been secured, that law and order have been maintained.

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This author's review of political patterns "reveals problems common to most developing countries and highlights the paradox of the one party system." And, as he writes, "although the growth of this political form in Africa has caused great concern among those who hope that democracy will thrive in the new states, the evolution of one-party systems after independence suggests that the most crucial problem is not authoritarianism, but lack of authority."

French-Speaking West Africa

By ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG

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THE LEGACY of a common recent past provides a persistent bond among the states of French-speaking West Africa and links them with distant relations in Equatorial Africa and in Madagascar. French culture prevails beyond language and encompasses education, the bureaucracy, and the social amenities valued by the élite. In spite of many basic disagreements, the leaders of Guinea, Mali, and the Ivory Coast have retained the memory of fraternal fervor in the ranks of the *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* which they founded together in 1946. Similarly, politicians in Senegal, Upper Volta, and Dahomey look back upon the days of a common front in Paris.

Most of these states have also retained close political and economic ties with France, partly because of continued dependence, and because of the Franco-African tradition in which they served their apprenticeship. Searching for continental unity, French-speaking Africans have always found it easier to communicate with one another, even across an entire continent, than with their English-speaking neighbors.

Nevertheless, in the five years since French West Africa was divided, its eight components have emerged as distinctive independ-

ent states. Social and economic variations, less visible under the common mantle of centralized French rule, are shaping distinct patterns of development in Dahomey, the Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta, the six countries discussed here.¹ On international issues and in terms of approach to economic and social modernization, their outlook encompasses the whole range of African ideology, from the most conservative to the most radical.

More quickly than most nationalist leaders, French-speaking Africans seized on the one-party system as a solution to the problems of government in a new state. They share the desire for national unity of other new leaders; they were also familiar with the consequences of unfettered political competition under the French Fourth Republic. They were inspired by the Bonapartist tradition of France, which made its perennial reappearance at the very moment they assumed responsibility for government.

In different doses and according to individual style, they all adopted the techniques of cooptation, amalgamation, economic pressure, and coercion. With only minor exceptions their opponents shared their political outlook, had a weak structure of support based on regional or ethnic ties, and preferred the immediate rewards of office to the uncertainty of a future victory. Thus the

¹ Guinea is discussed elsewhere in this issue. The remaining country, Mauritania, is outside the author's competence.

leaders' task was relatively easy and the need for coercion slight. A few irreconcilables were exiled or jailed, with or without the benefit of due process of law. But in most cases this was followed by a grand reconciliation and an amalgamation of the opposition group into the regime. By the time of independence in 1960 or shortly thereafter, each of the six states was ruled by a *parti unifié*, which French-speaking Africans distinguish from a *parti unique*.

THE ONE PARTY SYSTEM

It has become clear recently that enforced political unanimity is not a substitute for national unity and that the social cleavages that gave rise to political differentiations in the past cannot be erased by political fiat. The method used to build up the unified party usually transferred opposition from outside to inside the party, where it reappeared in the form of factionalism whenever a controversial issue provided the necessary spark. As the enthusiasm of independence waned and the expectations that accompanied it were not fulfilled, grievances increased. A new political generation, usually much better educated than the founding fathers, began to demand a place in the sun.

If institutional channels for the expression of opposition are eliminated, pressures build up to the point of political explosion and take the form of plots to overthrow the regime. As a review of recent events indicates, in French-speaking West Africa it has become increasingly difficult to maintain the one-party system in equilibrium. Government reshuffles, which usually signify attempts to reinforce the ruling coalition, have become more frequent. Governments are less hesitant to abandon the rule of law and to use coercion; the opposition is quicker to resort to violence.²

DAHOMÉY

Although Upper Volta, Niger, and Dahomey are one-party states, the ruling organ-

ization has never been much more than a coalition of notabilities and their personal followings. For a long time, Dahomey was the scene of a three-cornered political struggle between a northern group led by Hubert Maga, the R.D.D. (*Rassemblement Démocratique Dahoméen*), and two southern ones. J. Ahomadegbe's U.D.D. (*Union Démocratique Dahoméenne*) and the P.N.D. (*Parti des Nationalistes de Dahomey*), itself a combination of organizations led by Sourou Migan Apithy and the trio E. Zinsou, I. Pinto, and A. Adande. In late 1960, Maga headed a coalition of the R.D.D. and the P.N.D. which, as the *Parti Dahoméen Unifié*, won two-thirds of the popular vote but secured all the seats in parliament. The U.D.D. was then dissolved and several of its leaders were charged with planning to execute a plot and detained.

Maga has since maintained his coalition by frequent cabinet changes. In mid-1962, he successfully co-opted one of the U.D.D. leaders into the cabinet. At the end of the year, he felt sufficiently secure to release Ahomadegbe himself; in 1963 all those involved in the 1961 plot were amnestied. Meanwhile, however, unity was threatened from another quarter. A P.D.U. (*Parti Dahoméen Unifié*) congress scheduled for the end of 1962 was repeatedly postponed because of the fear that regional quarrels might come to the fore.

UPPER VOLTA

Dahomey turned on its side becomes Upper Volta. Here, regional political centers are Ouagadougou, the heart of the Mossi empire in the east, and Bobo-Dioulasso in the west. In 1957, the first government coalition, forged by Ouezzin Coulibaly out of R.D.A. elements in Bobo and out of Mossi factions led by J. Conombo, J. Ouedraogo, and Maurice Yameogo, collapsed when the Mossi leaders withdrew. Yameogo was enticed back, however, and the government survived. After Coulibaly died in 1958, Yameogo triumphed with the support of personal followers in the Assembly. A disparate coalition of R.D.A. elements and of Mossi, led by J. Ouedraogo, aligned against him. By skillfully manipulat-

² Unless otherwise indicated, this review of recent events is based on weekly reports in *Afrique Nouvelle* (Dakar, weekly) and *West Africa* (London, weekly).

ing groups in the Assembly and by isolating Upper Volta from Senegal and Sudan, whence his opponents derived support, Yameogo obtained a monopoly for his coalition, the *Union Démocratique Voltaïque*.³

By pressing for independence in 1960, deporting the French High-Commissioner, and seeking a rapprochement with Ghana in 1961, Yameogo demonstrated his nationalism and obtained the support of a part of the intellectual opposition. He reinforced his position by imprisoning J. Ouedraogo and releasing him after destroying his political base in Ouagadougou. Similarly, the U.D.V. secured control over the R.D.A.'s stronghold in Bobo-Dioulasso. In 1962, Yameogo assumed direct control of the U.D.V. by becoming its secretary-general.

Nevertheless, political unity remains tenuous and has been maintained during the past year only through constant changes in government personnel. At the beginning of 1963, when the opposition seemed to be preparing for a comeback, Yameogo reinforced his state's security structures and assumed personal control over them. Since then Ouedraogo has been re-arrested along with several others and the cabinet has been purged.

NIGER

Niger, which some think might become the "sick man of Africa," is a political oddity which has been ruled by what is probably a minority party for nearly five years. In 1958, the Government was ruled by *Sawaba*, the majority party, which had retained the R.D.A.'s original radical orientation. Since the Government advocated a "no" response to the referendum on the French Community in September, 1958, and the officially recorded response of Niger indicated a majority of "yes," *Sawaba* was replaced as the ruling party by the *Parti Progressiste Nigérien* under the leadership of Boubou Hama and Hamani Diori.

³ For Upper Volta, see Immanuel Wallerstein, "Background to Paga," *West Africa*, July 25 and August 5, 1961; also, Simon Kiba, "Terre des Hommes," *Afrique Nouvelle*, March 21, 28 and April 4, 1962.

P.P.N. obtained 78.5 per cent of the votes in the election of December, 1958, with a turnout of only 25 per cent of the registered vote. Although *Sawaba* won six seats out of 60, that part of the election was voided and the organization itself was declared illegal in 1959. P.P.N. remained alone on the official political scene.

Since then, P.P.N. has slowly built up support by treating with Niger's powerful traditional chiefs and chipping away at *Sawaba*'s structure. Its leader, Djibo Bakary, has remained in exile, moving from Mali to Cairo and then to Ghana when Niger refused to have dealings with countries that gave him asylum. Although P.P.N. announced that it had finally secured a strong majority as demonstrated by the country-wide local elections of December, 1962 (in which the turnout rose to 87 per cent), sporadic violence in certain regions on the part of both *Sawaba* and the Government might indicate an incipient civil war. The Government felt the need to tighten its coercive apparatus in early 1963.

MALI

Political structures are much more developed in Mali, the Ivory Coast, and Senegal, where mass parties began to grow soon after World War II. As sections of the *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain*, the *Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire* and the *Union Soudanaise* of Mali created a highly structured apparatus of district branches and local committees extending throughout most of the land. Their example inspired Leopold Senghor to create a similar organization in Senegal after 1948.

The P.S.P. (*Parti Soudanais Progressiste*) led by Fily Dabo Sissoko and H. Dicko was neutralized in 1959 when Sissoko agreed to a merger. The P.S.P. had been the major obstacle to *Union Soudanaise* supremacy in Mali. A rump branch of P.S.P. under Dicko was dissolved later in the same year. Although the economy suffered a heavy blow after the Senegal-Sudan federation broke up in mid-1960, the renewal of nationalist fervor which followed the transformation of Sudan into the Mali Republic immediately after-

ward reinforced the *Union Soudanaise's* position under the leadership of Modibo Keita.

Nevertheless, Keita remains a sort of "primus inter pares" who maintains his position by constant negotiation with others. These include the representatives of Mali's major ethnic groups, which have a historic tradition akin to that of city states. In order to contain the radicals, Modibo Keita veered to the left on issues of economic and foreign policy. When trouble appeared on the right, following the creation of Mali's own currency in July, 1962, the *Union Soudanaise* eliminated the remnants of the P.S.P. Sissoïko and Dicko, tried by a political court, were sentenced to death.⁴ Nearly 100 of their followers were also punished.

It was then the turn of the radicals. The position of Modibo Keita, leader of the party left, was seriously weakened when he lost his post as Minister of Defense, and then as Minister of Interior (September, 1962) while remaining in the cabinet and in the party's ruling political bureau. The youth wing of the party, created to contain the second generation (but which had developed an autonomous life and was being used as a political stepping stone by Henri Corenthin), was also brought under control following the party congress of September, 1962.⁵

THE IVORY COAST

Because of the Ivory Coast's fervent attachment to the West and the business-minded language of its leaders, it is seldom noted that this was one of the first African countries to achieve tight one-party rule and that President Felix Houphouët-Boigny's autocratic rule has steadily increased. Although the Ivory Coast's ethnic heterogeneity does not make for natural unity, Houphouët-Boigny soon mastered ethnic arithmetic and elimi-

nated most of his opponents by 1957 by rewarding them for joining the P.D.C.I. (*Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire*).⁶

Nevertheless, primordial loyalties remain strong and have even manifested themselves in separatist movements. Felix Houphouët-Boigny's rejection of the language of nationalism and of socialism has alienated most educated members of the younger generation, including university students and the bulk of white-collar workers and civil servants. The country's very economic success has also led to a more acute and more wide-spread awareness of material needs than exists in most African countries.

Civil disorder in the form of xenophobic outbursts (perhaps fomented by opposition groups) erupted in October, 1958. The following year, the civil servants of Abidjan defied a government order forbidding a strike and the Agni of Sanwi created a government-in-exile in Ghana. Although the regime attempted to contain the second generation by allowing some of its leaders to organize a youth branch of the party, J.R.D.A.C.I., and appointing many of them to high posts, it did not secure a loyal following among them.

In late 1962, an obscure coalition of northern, eastern, and western ethnic groups combined with leaders of the youth branch of the party—including three members of the cabinet—to form an opposition. The Government charged that this opposition movement was planning to overthrow the regime and assassinate the President. Several hundred arrests were made in January, 1963; they were followed by a purge of the party and of the civil service. A political court, operating secretly in President Houphouët-Boigny's own home, sentenced 13 persons to death and 51 others to various periods of confinement with hard labor.

Although it was hoped that this would constitute sufficient warning to all potential opponents, a second plot appeared to be brewing during the President's absence from late April to mid-August, 1963. Upon his return, another wave of arrests and depositions took place. This time two founders of the party, Coffi Gadeau and Jean-Baptiste Mockey, and

⁴ Neither these death sentences, nor the ones meted out in the Ivory Coast in 1963, were carried out.

⁵ Victor D. DuBois, "Mali Five Years After the Referendum," *American Universities Field Staff Reports Service*, West Africa Series, Vol. VI, No. 3 (Mali), 1963.

⁶ For a detailed case study of the Ivory Coast as a one-party system through 1962, see the author's *One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

four other members of the cabinet were allegedly implicated. A governmental reorganization in September, 1963, concentrated even greater power in the hands of the President.

SENEGAL

Senegal also has a one party system. Nonetheless a tradition of long contact with Europe and of African participation in local and in French affairs, a large, well-educated élite, and the cultural distinction of Leopold Senghor have contributed to the growth of civility. The country has long been the focus of hopes for the survival of democracy in French-speaking West Africa.⁷

The ruling U.P.S. (*Union Progressiste Sénégalaise*) resulted from the merger of Senegalese socialists under Lamine Gueye with Senghor's B.D.S. (*Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais*) itself a group of regional organizations. The regime tolerated dissent both inside and outside the Party. Executive authority was shared between President Senghor, the national hero, and Prime Minister Mamadou Dia, architect of party organization and of economic development, who represented a younger generation. By 1960, the Socialists had lost strength and the opposition of Muslim religious leaders had been contained.

Senegal suffered a severe economic blow when it lost its Sudanese market in mid-1960. Furthermore, the tradition of "clans" which has always been manifest in local politics continued to plague the party. Casamance, an area geographically and ethnically distinct from the rest of the country, provided a ready-made base for opposition. Without jeopardizing the rule of law, the U.P.S. nevertheless managed to surmount challenges which appeared from 1961 to mid-1962 in the Medina of Dakar, in Casamance, among intellectuals, students, and some labor unions.

Increasingly, however, the major problem lay within the party. In 1962, factionalism between their followers began to drive a visible wedge between the President and the

Prime Minister. Repeated attempts to keep controversy within bounds by reorganizing the party leadership and the cabinet failed. Conflict came to a head in mid-December, when members of the National Assembly introduced a motion of censure against the Prime Minister and refused to withdraw it in spite of party pressure. On December 17, Dia ordered the signers arrested and sent the Assembly home. Nevertheless, members met, approved the motion and asked President Senghor to take full control of the executive. After a few hours' armed struggle, during which not a single shot was fired, the Senghoristes triumphed. Dia was arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment in May, 1963, after an open trial. Four of his ministers were also severely punished.

The new Constitution, which gives the President exclusive executive powers, was unanimously approved by a referendum in which 99 per cent of the adult population participated. Further attempts were made to bring the intellectual opposition into the party and to transform the trade union movement into an ancillary body. Several events in the summer of 1963 suggested new difficulties. An emergency meeting of the national council of the party was followed by an administrative purge and a wave of arrests, including the arrest of two additional members of Dia's cabinet. Military exercises were held as well. Although Senghor's triumph over Dia was perceived by some observers as a victory for democracy, recent trends suggest that Senegal may well be driven in a more authoritarian direction.

PATTERNS AND PARADOX

This brief review of political patterns reveals problems common to most developing countries and highlights the paradox of the one-party system. Although the growth of this political form in Africa has caused great concern among those who hope that democracy will thrive in the new states, the evolution of one-party systems after independence suggests that the most crucial problem is not authoritarianism, but lack of authority. The use of coercion by a small political élite masks

⁷ See, for example, E. Milcent's section on Senegal in G. Carter (ed.), *African One-Party States* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962).

the fact that political structures providing minimal order and stability are either absent or very weak. This vastly complicates the major tasks of government, national integration and economic development.

THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE

Although economic motives are by no means the sole determinant of foreign policy among the French-speaking states of West Africa, economic dependence on France has long been a major factor in shaping their outlook. It helps explain why all of them except Guinea agreed to forego independence in 1958.⁸ Since then, although they have become independent, all but Mali have hesitated to pursue an independent course in foreign policy.

Strategies to achieve economic development are in part governed by economic facts which, in the case of the countries under consideration, are extremely unfavorable. Niger, Dahomey and Upper Volta have an estimated gross national product per capita of \$40, among the lowest in Africa.⁹ Exports, which must provide revenue to import capital equipment needed for development, consist of small amounts of poor products: Dahomey manages to sell its palm kernels, palm oil and a few other commodities for about \$15 million a year; Niger ekes out \$14 million at best for its peanuts; Upper Volta, which exports cattle, earns only about \$5 million, although this is compensated in part by the revenue brought in by its migrant workers in Ghana and in the Ivory Coast.¹⁰

In the absence of an entrepreneurial class, government must take the lead in capital investment. But in these countries, the state barely manages to pay for essential routine services. Although Dahomey drew up a modest budget of about \$25 million for 1962

(80 per cent of which was paid out in civil service salaries), there was a deficit of 15 per cent by the end of the year. The state has no resources for investment. Although "Dahomeyan socialism" will be pursued by means of a plan to be launched this year, financing must come entirely from external sources. Similarly, Upper Volta planned to spend \$34 million in 1963 for current expenses and development but knew in advance that its own resources could cover only \$27 million of the total.

FRENCH AID

This absolute poverty explains the important role that France (the country most willing to help) continues to play. Its assistance takes the form of direct subsidies which cover annual budgetary deficits; contributions to development funds; protection for products, such as Niger's peanuts, which otherwise could perhaps not be sold. France also provides experienced teachers, technicians and civil servants and pays their salaries.

More surprising, perhaps, is a similar phenomenon with respect to the richer countries in the area. Senegal, with an estimated GNP per capital of \$175, and the Ivory Coast, with \$184, rank among the most fortunate African economies. But Senegal, which had already suffered heavy losses when French West Africa ceased to exist, was hard hit by its conflict with Sudan. In spite of one of the best development plans in Africa, little progress was made. The country's revenue from exports is more dependent than ever on the sale of peanuts.

By 1963, President Senghor spoke of agricultural and industrial stagnation and characterized the economic situation as "dramatic." Here also, government resources are barely sufficient to cover ordinary expenditures, as indicated by Senghor's recent revelation of a budgetary deficit of nearly \$37 million, or almost the entire amount devoted annually to development expenditures. The Senegalese plan, of which the country's leaders are immensely proud, is thus at the mercy of outsiders.

President Houphouet-Boigny's economic

⁸ This hypothesis is fully discussed by E. Berg, "The Economic Basis of Political Choice in French West Africa," *The American Political Science Review*, LIV, No. 3 (June, 1960), pp. 391-405.

⁹ All cited figures on gross national product are from A.I.D., as reprinted in *Africa Report*, VIII, No. 8 (August, 1963), p. 32.

¹⁰ All cited figures on exports are from the special issue of *Europe-France-Outremer*, No. 397 (May 1963).

liberalism has apparently attracted a substantial flow of private investments and economists are amazed at the Ivory Coast's prosperity. But the country's apparent wealth rests on a fragile base of coffee and cocoa, two commodities which have fared poorly on the world market in recent years. This has been balanced by a huge increase in coffee production. This would be of no avail in the face of a world glut were it not once again for French protection, under which Ivory Coast coffee has sold for as much as twice the value it would fetch on the world market.

Because the bulk of the economy, including government revenue, is related to coffee production, it is clear that the country's prosperity exists by the grace of France. As in Senegal, an additional form of subsidy is France's contribution to the staffing of educational institutions and of the civil service administration.

The Ivory Coast's foreign policy clearly reflects its economic concerns. So far, it has carefully avoided any moves that France might find objectionable. It has refused to establish diplomatic relations or even to negotiate commercial and cultural agreements with the U.S.S.R., and has been firmly opposed to the admission of Communist China to the United Nations. Nasser has been an enemy ever since Suez and in spite of some pressures on the part of its Muslim population, the Ivory Coast has no contacts with the United Arab Republic. Only in 1962 did it begin to engage in more active relations with the United States. In the main, its course has been oriented almost exclusively toward France and by extension toward the European Economic Community which, it is hoped, will help France shoulder its African burdens.

TOWARDS GREATER INDEPENDENCE

Although the other countries of the group originally shared this stand, they have recently begun to move in a slightly more independent direction. Like the Ivory Coast and Niger, Senegal has a defense agreement with France; but after some hesitation Senegal

established diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. and with other Soviet bloc countries in mid-1962. It has supported the admission of Communist China to the United Nations and exchanges ambassadors with the U.A.R.

Dahomey and Upper Volta refused to sign a regional defense treaty with France and receive only military technical assistance; in addition, Dahomey has established diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. and Upper Volta has negotiated a customs agreement with Ghana. Even Niger has initiated commercial and cultural exchanges with the Soviet Union. Yet in all these cases, ties with France remain extremely strong and a major concern in recent months has been to gain access to the Common Market.

Mali has departed most drastically from a Europe-oriented course. Following the precedent of Guinea and Ghana, it rushed to establish diplomatic exchanges and a variety of agreements with both the Soviet and the Chinese blocs shortly after independence. Although Modibo Keita was awarded the Lenin Peace Prize in 1963, this does not indicate commitment to either of the Communist camps. After 1960, France continued to provide substantial assistance to Mali and, in 1962, new agreements were negotiated. Along with the other countries discussed, Mali has recently become an associated member of the European Economic Community (the Common Market).

AFRICAN UNITY

In relation to the question of continental unity, the common heritage of the French-speaking African states assumes its greatest significance. On the whole, a common tradition has facilitated the maintenance of old ties and the development of new ones encompassing all of French-speaking Africa from Mauritania to the island of Madagascar. At the same time, this heritage constitutes an obstacle to those who wish to erase the boundaries of the spheres of European influence carved out in the late nineteenth century.

In spite of the efforts of many African lead-

ers, French West Africa ceased to exist as a unit shortly after the creation of the French Community. The Ivory Coast, which had contributed to its demise, organized a much looser association with Dahomey, Niger, and Upper Volta, the *Conseil de l'Entente*. Only Senegal and Sudan joined a genuine supranational unit, the Federation of Mali. When even this failed, Sudan (which then became the Mali Republic) joined Ghana and Guinea to form a Union of African States, the first attempt to create a supranational unit composed of countries with different colonial traditions.

THE U.A.M.

Senegal then worked with the *Entente*, as well as French-speaking states in Equatorial Africa, Cameroon and the Malagasy Republic, to form a new organization which was institutionalized in 1961 as the *Union Africaine et Malgache* (U.A.M.). This organization later acquired an economic arm, OAMCE, a common airline, *Air Afrique*, and a defense organization, UAMD. A postal and telecommunications union, UAMPT, was created. Although its members retain full sovereignty, U.A.M. is run by a council of heads of government which elects a president from its midst. The council appoints a secretary-general with permanent headquarters in Dahomey. OAMCE and the other components have a parallel structure headed by a council of appropriate ministers.

Although from the beginning there have been divergences inside U.A.M., it has emerged as the most persistent and stable supranational body in Africa. This record can be partly attributed to the skill of the leaders involved. Primarily it stems from shared language and tradition, a common concern with the reinforcement of the members' bargaining position vis-à-vis both France and the Common Market, and a shared view that cooperation rather than supranational political integration provides a realistic path toward African unity.

Is the continued existence of U.A.M. a threat to the continent? Most English-speaking African leaders have long suspected that

it is nothing but a form of neo-colonialism, a trick used by France to maintain itself as an African overlord. Guinea and Mali have also been suspicious. But from mid-1962 on, it seems that the desire to present a united African front to the world has provided sufficient incentive to overcome these controversies.

The three R.D.A. greats, the Ivory Coast, Mali, and Guinea, celebrated a grand reunion in spite of profound ideological differences. The conflict between Senegal and Mali was settled. Upper Volta, Dahomey and Niger established closer ties with their English-speaking neighbors.

All these and other rapprochements culminated in the African heads of state summit conference held at Addis Ababa in May, 1963. At this conference, the U.A.M.'s concept of African unity, shared by other Monrovia powers, triumphed and found its expression in the creation of an Organization for African Unity (O.A.U.).

Was the summit really reached? While Sékou Touré announced that the Ghana-Guinea-Mali union had been superseded and dissolved, the U.A.M. leaders, meeting at Cotonou, decided that their organization was not incompatible with O.A.U. and should continue to function. This decision was bitterly attacked at the Dakar meeting of the foreign ministers of O.A.U. in August, 1963, by Jaja Wachuku who, in the name of Nigeria, accused U.A.M. of sabotaging African unity. The aftermath of the summit thus indicates that the division between most of French-speaking Africa and the rest of the continent remains sharply delineated.

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As this specialist points out, "In its domestic policies, Guinea set out to create an African society freed from the heritage of the past." Although he believes that Guinea has "avoided a cold war commitment to the United States," this author outlines "the growth of warm relations between radical Guinea and the capitalist United States."

Guinea's First Five Years

By DAVID HAPGOOD

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GUINEA's birth as a nation was the stormiest in French Black Africa. Under the leadership of Sékou Touré, Guinea chose independence by voting "non" in the referendum on limited autonomy staged by French President Charles de Gaulle on September 28, 1958. All the other French African colonies accepted limited autonomy by voting "oui." (All are now independent except French Somaliland.) De Gaulle reacted to Guinea's refusal by ignoring Guinea's request for diplomatic recognition, abruptly pulling French personnel out of the country, and denying French aid.

Guinea's history since 1958 has been deeply influenced by reactions to this break with France. Because of his dramatic defiance of de Gaulle, Sékou Touré is probably the most admired of French African leaders; and, because Guinea soon became a focus of the cold war, this little West African nation has received international attention out of all proportion to its size.

Guinea in 1958 had many problems and few resources. As in most African countries, there was a severe shortage of African administrators and technicians to replace the French who were no longer there. The predominantly Muslim population was composed of three diverse groups—the Foulahs, the Malinkés and the Soussous—and a number of

smaller tribes, each with its own language. Most of the people lived by subsistence agriculture. Guinea's trade balance was in deficit. She had exports of bananas, coffee, pineapples and diamonds but major deposits of bauxite and iron ore were only just beginning to be exploited.

Sékou Touré, Guinea's leader, came from a poor peasant family—son of a Malinké father and Soussou mother. Educated by correspondence school, he became a French colonial administration worker, and, later, was noted as a trade union leader. By 1956, when the *Parti Démocratique de Guinée* (P.D.G.) proved it could win local elections, despite colonial hostility, Touré was its leader. It was a short step from this post to the prime ministership of the local government in 1957. Next he led Guinea to independence.

After the 1958 referendum, when de Gaulle isolated Guinea, Touré and the newly independent country found themselves isolated indeed. The United States and Britain postponed recognition out of deference to France; the other French African leaders, whatever their sympathies, would not risk antagonizing de Gaulle by aiding Guinea. Touré turned to Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana (who promised him a large loan—only a portion of which was ever paid) and the now-defunct Casablanca Group¹ (an association unified in large part by animosity towards the ex-colonial countries.

¹ Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Morocco and the United Arab Republic.

Outside Africa, Touré found the Communist bloc countries willing backers. They extended an estimated \$127 million in aid (most of which came from the Soviet Union). These loans, for the most part, were long-term, low-interest and repayable in Guinean exports. Guinea's trade, therefore, shifted rapidly from the franc zone to the Communist bloc. With an influx of Russian, East European and Chinese diplomats and technicians, Guinea was considered by many Western observers, for the first three years of its independent existence, to be "in the Soviet orbit."

RIFT WITH FRANCE

Amidst Western denunciations—Touré was described as an African Castro; Guinea was called the "Communist beachhead in Africa"—relations between Paris and Conakry grew steadily worse. On March 1, 1960, Touré announced the creation of an independent Guinean franc to replace the CFA franc then circulated in all of French West Africa. In May, Guinea accused the French of providing arms for a plot against the Touré regime (said to be based in the neighboring states of Senegal and the Ivory Coast) and hastened to close down the French banks, trading companies and insurance companies.² Nonetheless, relations between France and Guinea were never completely severed, and Guinean students continued to attend the University of Paris.

In its domestic policies, Guinea set out to create an African society freed from the heritage of the past. Touré wrote: "When we say 'decolonialization,' we mean we want to destroy the habits, conceptions and ways of conduct of colonialism. We are determined to replace them with forms that are Guinean forms, conceived by the people of Guinea."³

² See Victor D. Dubois, "Reorganization of the Guinean Economy" (VDB-1-63), in American Universities Field Staff publication. Dubois' reports to the A.U.F.S. are basic reading on Guinea since independence.

³ Touré's writings are published by *Presence Africaine* (Paris) and the *Imprimerie Nationale* (Conakry). Some volumes are in English.

⁴ For a study of the party, see "Le Parti Démocratique de Guinée," by Bernard Charles, *Revue Française de Science Politique*, June, 1962.

PARTY LEADERSHIP

The change in Guinean society was to be accomplished under the leadership of the P.D.G., the "motor of the Revolution," the "guardian of the will of the people."⁴ In a one-party state, the party was to dominate the government; portraits of Guinean leaders today list their party rank before their government position. Through the party, democratically organized, the people would control the élite that operates the state; that was the essential theory of the P.D.G. Since independence, the P.D.G. has continued to widen its organization; it now has party committees in 7,000 villages and towns. According to party leaders, 1.5 million Guineans—virtually the entire adult population—have bought party cards at \$.40 each. At the top of the party hierarchy is the 15-member Bureau Politique National (B.P.N.).

The doctrine of party supremacy, its form of organization and the Marxist vocabulary that flavors Touré's writings have led some observers to equate the P.D.G. with a Communist party. In reality, there is a crucial difference between the two, as Touré himself has noted. A Communist party is an élite that restricts political power to a small minority. Conversely, the P.D.G. attempts to spread political power, or at least political participation, throughout the population. A second major difference is that the P.D.G. rejects the doctrine of class struggle; Touré has frequently said that there are no classes in Africa.

A SENSE OF UNITY

Since independence, the P.D.G. has sought to eliminate competing political forces and to instill a sense of unity and national consciousness in people who formerly thought of themselves as "Foulahs" or "Malinkés" rather than "Guineans." On an ethnic level, opposition was centered mainly among the Foulah in the north, the only people to turn in a sizable "oui" vote in the 1958 referendum. But Foulah opposition appears to have vanished: the number-two man in the government, Diallo Saifoulaye, is a Foulah, and a Foulah opposition leader, Barry Diawadou, was taken into

the cabinet in December, 1958.⁵ At the present time, it seems certain that any political opposition will arise within the P.D.G., not outside it.

The party tries, sometimes by ungentle persuasion, to get everyone to attend the local party meetings held on Thursday nights. In his radio broadcasts, Touré urges the people to take part in political decisions and to use the P.D.G. as a channel to make their wishes known to the state.

In an effort to revolutionize a traditional society in which the elders ruled the village and the men ruled the family, the P.D.G. has tried to enhance the place of women and youth. In the 10-member village party committee, three seats are reserved for women and two for members of the party's youth organization, the *Jeunesse du Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* (J.R.D.A.). Unlike most leaders of Muslim nations, Touré has stated his opposition to polygamy, though, pragmatically, he has not tried to outlaw it. Guinea, like several other African nations, is rapidly expanding education: school enrollment has tripled.

To promote national rather than ethnic loyalty, secondary school students are required to attend a school outside their tribal region and government officials are not as a rule assigned to their native region. The result, ironically, has been to stimulate the use of the colonial language, since French is often the only language that Guineans have in common outside their own region. After independence, the P.D.G. said it intended to replace French with an African language, but this project seems to have been shelved. French is still the language of instruction, and Touré makes his major speeches in French.

The results of the party's political and social policies are hard to measure. Some say that the P.D.G. does little more than mobilize the people to parade in honor of visiting foreign dignitaries. Others, including this re-

cent traveler in Guinea, believe that the party has made at least a beginning toward creating a nation out of its heterogeneous peoples.

ECONOMIC FAILURES

In the economic field, however, Touré's government has had one failure after another. At independence, Guinea had two major objectives: to break the European hold on its economy, and to start the nation on the road toward planned economic development. The state was to take control of internal and external trade from the European trading companies and the Lebanese merchants. Development was to be carried out mainly by foreign aid and "human investment"—the mobilization of underemployed villagers to provide free labor for projects of community interest: building roads, schools, dispensaries.

Guinea set up state trading monopolies and attempted to regulate the nation's economic life. But the resulting chaos cost the Guinean consumer far more than the profits formerly drained off by foreign traders. Price regulation meant corruption and black marketing on a large scale. Since the new Guinean franc had little value outside the country, officials smuggled products such as cattle and rice across the borders to neighboring countries, and sold them for hard currency which they then spent on luxury imports. Incompetent operation of the port of Conakry and the railroad hurt Guinea's exports: insecticides did not arrive when needed; bananas and pineapples rotted before they could be loaded for export.

Communist bloc aid proved disappointing. Instead of developing Guinea's productive capacity, Communist aid was spent on spectacular showpieces: the Patrice Lumumba printing plant (the "most modern in Africa," but running at around five per cent of capacity), Ilyushin-18 jets for a national airline, a sports stadium, a hotel.

In their first major venture in black Africa, the Russians hurried into Guinea without much preparation. Their agricultural equipment was ill-suited to the tropics, and when it broke down spare parts seldom followed. The consumer goods they sent were over-

⁵ Diallo and Barry are the family names. In French-speaking Africa, family names are sometimes placed before, sometimes after, the given name. The practice in this article is to follow African usage in the first reference and to use the family name in subsequent references.

priced (even by comparison with the exorbitant prices charged by the European trading companies) and often ludicrously inappropriate: pineapple sold at \$1 a can while Guinea's delicious fresh pineapples sold for one-fourth as much. Though the Russians did *not* send snow plows to Guinea (they sent machines for cutting through heavy brush, but the myth of the snow plows is too good to be dropped by the Western press), they did send ladies' handbags and thousands of seats for nonexistent toilets.

Informally, Russians blamed Guinean officials for some of the fantastic orders placed against Communist credits. But in their construction projects the Communist bloc nations clearly indulged the new nation's taste for the spectacular at the expense of its productive needs. And, in their relations with Guineans, the Communist technicians were often overbearing in a society where smooth personal relations are highly prized.

"Human investment," meanwhile, was not providing the results the P.D.G. had hoped for. At first great claims were made for it, but, by 1962, "human investment" had all but disappeared from the Guinean political mythology. The causes of its failure are complex. Primarily, the party seems to have failed to convince the people that the projects were in their interest; often they were not, as in the case of housing for government officials. Under the circumstances, "human investment" seemed little different from the forced labor imposed a generation before by France. But despite its eclipse, "human investment" remains an attractive method of development—provided popular interest can be aroused—in a nation that lacks capital and has a surplus of underemployed hands.

By 1961, the Guinean economy was in trouble. Communist aid saddled the nation with a debt, estimated at some \$30–\$35 million, which mortgaged Guinea's exports for years to come. Production was declining rather than increasing. Though the peasant living on subsistence agriculture was little affected, the capital was afflicted with shortages that gave it a war-time black market atmosphere. There was only one bright spot

in the economy, and that, ironically, was both capitalist and foreign. The FRIA bauxite mining operation, owned by the international aluminum interests, was rapidly increasing production and its exports were taking up the slack left by falling coffee and banana earnings.

In African affairs, Touré found himself in a position of splendid isolation. His prestige was high, but the other French African states—thanks largely to Guinea—had achieved independence and French aid besides. The Casablanca Group provided few tangible benefits; the Ghana-Guinea-Mali "union" existed on paper only; Guinea was on bad terms with its neighbors.

THE TEACHERS' PLOT

At home, a small group of "intellectuals" (secondary school teachers) was grumbling discreetly that they deserved a higher position in the state. In many ways, then, the times seemed ripe for change.

The turning point came in the so-called "teachers' plot" of November, 1961. Five leaders of the teachers' union were arrested on the charge of circulating a memorandum criticizing the government. On November 23, the students at the secondary schools in Conakry went on strike, and disturbances broke out in Labé, the Foulah town that turned in a heavy "oui" vote in the 1958 referendum. On December 5, Touré accused the plotters of being in touch with an "Eastern Embassy." Two weeks later, Guinea abruptly expelled the Russian Ambassador, Daniel Solod. The leaders of the "plot," originally sentenced to ten years, were then sentenced to death, but apparently they have not been executed. When Guinean students abroad publicly declared their "solidarity" with the Soviet Ambassador, they were ordered home.

How much of a plot there really was, and the degree of Soviet involvement in it, are questions to which there are still no sure answers. What is clear, however, is the pattern of interests that led the teachers and the Russians to oppose Touré and the P.D.G. Throughout his career, Touré has maintained

his desire for complete African independence and his distrust of overly Europeanized Africans. An ideal of the P.D.G., if not always the practice, is popular control of the educated élite. In July, 1961, Touré criticized the teachers for attempting to form a "privileged intellectual caste." In their opposition to Touré, the "intellectuals"—both teachers and students—made it clear that they preferred the East to Touré's neutralism; an élite Communist party would have served their interests better than the mass-controlled P.D.G. Symbolically, it was the uneducated youth of the J.R.D.A., the party's youth arm, that smashed the strike of the élite students.

As for the Russians, they were now the chief foreign presence in Guinea; if Guinea was under foreign pressure, it was not from the "imperialists" but from the Soviet Union, which now held a mortgage on the Guinean economy. Ambassador Solod was known to be friendly to the teachers and critical of the Touré regime. If the Soviets did encourage a plot, it should be added, they were guilty of a complete misreading of Guinean politics: the small band of teachers had no chance against the mass power of the P.D.G.

The "plot" and its aftermath were followed by far-reaching and rapid changes in Guinean foreign policy. Touré's defiance of the Soviet Union, like his "non" to de Gaulle, was daring but not foolhardy. For there was an open door at the United States Embassy, where Ambassador William Attwood had argued all along that Guinea was not lost to the East. Unlike France and the Soviet Union, the United States was not suspected of meddling in Guinea's politics; and Attwood did not rush in where Solod had stumbled. The result was the growth of warm relations between radical Guinea and the capitalist United States. The modest American aid program was expanded and, in contrast to showy Soviet projects, it focused on increasing rice production and other practical goals. Later, the Peace Corps went to Guinea.

In the Cuban crisis of October, 1962, Touré refused a Russian request for use of the Conakry airport (built with Communist aid)

as a transit stop to Cuba. In the spring of 1963, American jets inaugurated New York-Conakry flights at the same airport, and Touré spoke warmly of the United States at the visiting American Trade Fair. Guinea adopted an investment code designed to attract foreign capital; and, at the P.D.G. congress in 1962, Touré spoke of Guinea's need for capital while passing over Soviet aid in silence.

But, as he had before (with the Russians), Touré avoided a cold war commitment to the United States. To balance the growing American presence in Conakry—Pan American Airways is even planning to build a hotel there—Touré carefully keeps on good terms with Communist China. The Chinese were never accused in the teachers' plot, and their modest aid program—a cigarette factory is their main project—is apparently being carried out efficiently. (Then, too, some Soviet aid still comes in, though the major projects appear to have been abandoned.) In dealing with aluminum interests, Touré has also balanced Guinea's commitments. The concession to exploit Guinea's largest bauxite deposit, at Boké in the north, was given, not to the FRIA interests, but to Harvey Aluminum, an American firm that is an "outsider" among the aluminum companies.

In addition, Touré embarked on a patient campaign to settle Guinea's differences with France. Fortunately, the claims and counter-claims on both sides were roughly equal. France's main claim arose from Guinea's seizure of French assets; Guinea's stemmed from France's failure to pay pensions owed to Guinean veterans of the French Army. These financial issues were settled in May, 1963, after lengthy negotiations, clearing the way for improved relations between Guinea and her ex-ruler. Still, the détente does not mean that Guinea will revert to the status of a French client-state. Guinea has shown no sign of joining the African and Malagasy Union, the 14-member association of pro-French states. And, at this writing, Guinea has not rejoined the franc zone from which it broke away in 1960.

In the past two years, Guinea has been ac-

tive in African diplomacy, with notable success. Touré has mended his fences with his two pro-French neighbors, Senegal and the Ivory Coast. The border with Senegal, closed in 1960, is now open for trade. President Felix Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, whom Touré once described as a French puppet, made an official tour of Guinea in late 1962; in their speeches Touré and Houphouët spoke of the good old days before 1958. In continental politics, Touré was a prime mover in ending the division of Africa between the Casablanca and Monrovia groups; his diplomacy worked successfully toward the establishment in May, 1963, of the continent-wide Organization of African Unity.

DOMESTIC POLICY

Guinea's domestic policy has undergone sweeping changes during this same period, though not for the same reasons. Starting in 1961, before the "teachers' plot," the regime began to reduce state control of the economy. The export-import monopolies were broken into smaller units, most of which now compete with private traders. Planning and administration, which had been directed entirely from Conakry, were decentralized: most development funds, for example, must now come from local budgets rather than from the national budget.

It is tempting, particularly to Westerners, to equate these changes with a general rejection of Communist methods after 1961. However, it is probably more accurate to view Guinea's domestic shifts as a pragmatic recognition by Touré and the P.D.G. leadership that the present status of Guinea's communications and administrative resources makes it impossible to run the nation from Conakry.

Clearly, the state apparatus was not equal to the tasks set for it. Despite recent changes, Guinea is still plagued with administrative problems, notably corruption. A major scandal broke out in the national bank late in 1962. To recoup some of the state's financial losses due to corruption, Touré abruptly exchanged all currency in early 1963; he had the new bills printed secretly in Great Britain,

whereas the previous Guinean francs had been printed in Czechoslovakia.

Despite the nation's difficulties, the P.D.G. remains securely in control, and the attractive, dynamic Sékou Touré is the party's unquestioned leader. Guinean politics has been extraordinarily stable. No one was purged from the party's governing body, the B.P.N., until this year, when its size was reduced from 17 to 15 members. The Guinean revolution so far has been mild; the Guineans have been notably gentle in their treatment of French residents who stayed in the country through the darkest period of Franco-Guinean relations.

Indeed, *immobilisme* within the party leadership has proved to be a problem for Touré. In December, 1962, at the P.D.G. congress, Touré broadly hinted that the party might well drop those members of the B.P.N. who were corrupt or incompetent. But the congress re-elected the entire B.P.N. Touré then shifted administrative power to his closest collaborators, notably Diallo, and his brother Ismael Touré, but he did not attempt to upset the congress' decision. For Touré is by no means a one-man ruler: he has tried to create a party mechanism that can carry on without him.

Five years after independence, Guinea is in a period that might be compared to the Thermidor of the French Revolution. The first exhilaration has passed, and there is somewhat of a sense of letdown. Guinean officials admit that the three-year plan was a failure. Productivity has not increased, although mineral earnings will probably prevent any crisis in foreign trade. At the same time, the P.D.G. has established its lines of communication with the Guinean people, and one senses among many Guineans a realization of the responsibilities of independence that is often lacking in African nations still heavily dependent on an ex-colonial power.

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"The Republic of South Africa's attitude toward the territory [of South West Africa] is historically conditioned and based on real ties of family, economics and security," according to this scholar. "Inevitably, with the steadily mounting wave of international disapproval and condemnation of the Republic's internal policies, and the threats of the independent African states, the question of security has assumed new proportions which affect the South African government's attitude toward the future of the territory."

The Territory of South West Africa

By RONALD B. BALLINGER

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SOUTH WEST AFRICA lies on the west coast of Africa between latitudes 17 and 29 south. Its inhospitable and barren coastline of nearly 1,000 miles is bounded in the north by the Kunene River which separates it from the Portuguese territory of Angola. Here, a narrow corridor of land—the Caprivi Zipfel—extends eastwards for about 300 miles, bringing the territory to the border of Northern Rhodesia. In the south, the Orange River marks the boundary with the Republic of South Africa. In the east South West Africa borders on both South Africa and the Bechuanaland Protectorate. Covering an area of approximately 318,000 square miles, South West Africa is roughly equal to Texas and Louisiana combined.

Today, the population numbers approximately 525,000, comprising 73,200 Europeans, 24,000 Coloured people, about 16,000 Bushmen and just above 410,000 Africans. It has been estimated that nearly 287,500 live in the reserves which are scattered all over the territory. Some of them have very small populations. The greatest concentration, however, is to be found in the four northern reserves of the Kaokoveld, Ovamboland,

Okavango and the Caprivi strip where the African inhabitants number some 261,000. In this tribal region there is no white settlement and government control is exercised mainly through the chiefs.

The territory has no large towns. The capital, Windhoek, is the largest, with a population of under 40,000; and there are smaller towns such as the ports of Luderitz and Swakopmund, and Tsumeb, the principal copper and lead mining centre. Walvis Bay, the largest port, belongs to the Republic of South Africa, and although it is administered by the Administration of South West Africa it remains a part of the Cape Province of the Republic.

The basis of the territory's economy lies in its mineral wealth, its agricultural and pastoral products, especially wool and karakul skins, and its fishing industry. L. P. Green and T. J. D. Fair¹ estimate the value of the mineral output—including diamonds—at £25,398,000 a year; the agricultural and pastoral products at £15,000,000 a year; and the fishing industry's contribution at a further £7,000,000.² In the Native Reserves, particularly in the north (which may be described as a heavily populated area), the economy is still largely subsistent in character; the region is almost untouched by any industrial or urban revolution.

¹ L. P. Green and T. J. D. Fair, *Development in Africa*. Witwatersrand University Press, Johannesburg, 1962, p. 94.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 111.

Until recently it has been customary to speak of South West Africa as an economic liability, of no economic value to the Republic, unlikely to pay its way or ever escape its debts to South Africa. Despite the territory's basic lack of resources and poor endowments, minerals apart, this view is certainly no longer correct. But economic considerations do little to explain why the territory has assumed such importance to South Africa; for an answer to this question we must examine the historical background and the realities of South Africa's present international crisis.

In 1878, the British government formally annexed Walvis Bay including an area of 374 square miles. Despite the urgings then and later of the Governor at the Cape, Her Majesty's Government remained opposed to any further extension of British influence in South West Africa. In 1880 and 1883, after Germany had inquired about the protection of her nationals there, Britain again refused to accept responsibility beyond the Walvis Bay area. Nonetheless, under pressure from a Cape Colony government which would have liked to annex the territory without additional expense, the British Foreign Office informed the German Ambassador in London that it would object if any other nation annexed Angra Pequena—the district in question. Unaware of any change in German foreign policy, the British government did not foresee the quarrel over German claims. Neither did it move fast enough to forestall the establishment of a German protectorate. No sooner had the Angra Pequena claim apparently been settled, with the Cape and British governments resolving to annex the rest of the coast, than the German government announced through its chargé d'affaires in London that German protection now extended as far as the Portuguese frontier. Thus

Angra Pequena grew into German South West Africa,³ on August 26, 1884. Walvis Bay remained in British hands and passed in time to South Africa.

At the outbreak of war in 1914 the Union of South Africa—now four years old—accepted a British proposal that Union forces should invade German South West Africa and seize the wireless stations of Swakopmund and Luderitz. After a brief campaign lasting from April to July, 1915, German forces in the colony surrendered to the South African Prime Minister, General Botha, who personally led the Union troops. The German colony was then placed under South African military administration until January 1, 1921. After this date South West Africa was administered by South Africa under a Class C Mandate on behalf of the League of Nations.

A CLASS C MANDATE

The essential characteristic of the Class C Mandate was the provision that the administering power should have:

full power of administration and legislation over the Territory subject to the present Mandate as an integral portion of the Union of South Africa and may apply the laws of the Union of South Africa to the Territory.⁴

In this respect Class C mandates differed from those in Classes A and B. The best illustration of the difference is to be found in the wording of Article 22 (paragraph 6) of the League Covenant which made provision for the system:

There are territories, such as South West Africa and certain of the South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their population or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilization, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, and other circumstances, can best be administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population.

It is hardly surprising that nothing was said about the possible future self-government or independence of the territories involved. The reason is not far to seek. Since the Principal Allied (and Associated) Powers agreed to forego annexations after World War I, the

³ See, A. J. P. Taylor, *Germany: First Bid for Colonies 1884-5*. Macmillan, 1938, and R. I. Lovell, *The Struggle for South Africa*.

⁴ Article 2 of the Mandate for South West Africa. By mandate, I mean the document of the League Council dated December 17, 1920, conveying the authority for and defining the terms of South Africa's administration of the Territory. By mandatory power I refer to the state administering the mandate.

Class C Mandate represented a compromise designed to avoid this contingency while providing its advantages. As General Jan Smuts, former South African leader, wrote on July 4, 1922, "C Mandates are in effect not far removed from annexation."⁵ And, in 1946, he said, "We have never found it necessary to annex because our authority was so very wide."⁶

The strategic importance of the territory was once more brought home to South Africans during the inter-war years. A commission of inquiry appointed by the Union government in 1936 reported the existence of Nazi organizations and cells not only in South West Africa but in the Union. Thus, South African governments have applied to South West Africa the principles of policy that obtained at home.

For example, in 1925, a Legislative Assembly of 12 elected and six nominated members was set up in the territory. The franchise, like the membership, was open to Europeans only. The Assembly was given powers to make ordinances on matters not reserved to the Union government, subject to the latter's approval.

The South West African Affairs Amendment Act (1949) provided for the representation of the territory's European inhabitants in the South African parliament. The allocation of seats was six in the House of Assembly and two in the Senate. And, in 1954, under the South West African Native Administration Act, the administration of native affairs was transferred to the then Union Minister of Native Affairs. At the same time the South West African Native Reserves were placed under the South African Native Trust.

The Republic of South Africa's attitude toward the territory is historically conditioned and based on real ties of family, economics and security. Inevitably, with the steadily mounting wave of international disapproval and condemnation of the Republic's internal policies, and the threats of the independent

African states, the question of security has assumed new proportions which affect the South African government's attitude toward the future of the territory. But, in the past, incorporation was the only goal the Republic could have envisaged. And, by 1945, the large majority of Europeans in South Africa and South West Africa were in favour of the full legal incorporation of the territory.

The question arose in a practical form in 1945 with the impending dissolution of the League of Nations and the birth of the United Nations. The future of the mandated territories was debated in the context of the United Nations trusteeship system. During 1946, the General Assembly of the United Nations rejected an application from General Smuts seeking approval of the incorporation of South West Africa into the Union.

Smuts contended that incorporation was the carefully ascertained and strongly expressed desire of the majority of the inhabitants. This request for incorporation, he argued, was the occasion of his application. The General Assembly recommended instead that the territory be placed under the trusteeship system and invited the Union to submit an agreement to that end. Alone among the former mandatories South Africa refused to do so.

In July, 1947, the South African government announced that it would not proceed with incorporation of the territory but would maintain the *status quo* in the spirit of the mandate and would continue to submit annual reports, for the information but not the action of the United Nations. Actually, only one report was ever submitted. The Trusteeship Committee and the General Assembly were so highly critical of the Administration that the Nationalist government, soon after it came to power in 1948, decided not to send another report.

Since 1946, the General Assembly has called annually on the Republic to place South West Africa under a trust agreement. The fact that the International Court in its advisory opinion of 1950 held that South Africa was under no legal obligation to do so was ignored by the Assembly. The Court on that occasion

⁵ Quoted in Quincy Wright, *Mandates Under the League of Nations*. p. 62.

⁶ South African House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 56, Col. 3674.

found, however, that South Africa was under an obligation to submit reports, and that the supervisory functions formerly exercised by the League were to be exercised by the United Nations. The Court also considered that "the degree of supervision to be exercised by the General Assembly should not . . . exceed that which applied under the Mandates System."

The General Assembly, faced with the South African government's refusal to accept this decision (an opinion, not a binding judgment) then set up an *ad hoc* committee on South West Africa which, in time, became permanent. Its task was to examine all the available evidence about the territory—this came to include petitioners—and report annually to the Assembly.

It is well known that from 1952 on these reports were issued concurrently with the General Assembly's increasingly critical examination of the entire structure of apartheid. As a result, the debates on South West Africa tended to become concerned less and less with the legal aspects of the matter and more and more with the rights and treatment of the indigenous non-European inhabitants. Now, when the administration of the territory is discussed in detail, i.e., when the debate turns to apartheid, the two United Nations agenda items seem to become one dispute.

Today, the aims of the group most hostile to South Africa in the General Assembly are to achieve the legal revocation of the mandate and to establish a United Nations "presence" in the territory preparatory to the introduction of universal suffrage and immediate self-government. The recommendations of the former committee on South West Africa have already covered these points.⁷

While these objectives are being pursued at the United Nations, a case also lies before the International Court of Justice. This, it will be recalled, was initiated by the governments of Ethiopia and Liberia—both states were

members of the League of Nations at the time of its dissolution—in November, 1960. They requested the Court to rule on a number of points concerning the status and character of South Africa's administration of the territory.

Ethiopia and Liberia charged that in every important consideration South Africa has violated the terms and the spirit of the mandate. They accuse the Republic of substantially modifying the terms of the mandate without the consent of the United Nations in a way inconsistent with the international status of the territory; and of failing "to promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and social progress of the inhabitants of the territory. . . ." (Article 2 of the mandate.) The Republic, among other things, is charged with introducing the policies of apartheid in the territory; the court is asked to rule that this is a breach of the mandate.

THE LEGAL BASIS OF ACTION

The legal basis for these proceedings is essentially provided by Article 7 of the mandate which reads:

The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute whatever should arise between the Mandatory and another Member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation and application of the provisions of the Mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations;

and Article 37 of the statute of the present International Court which makes provision for continuity between it and its predecessor:

Whenever a *treaty or convention in force* provides for reference of a matter to a tribunal to have been instituted by the League of Nations, or to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the matter shall as between parties to the present Statute be referred to the International Court of Justice. (*Italics mine*).

Since all members of the United Nations are *ipso facto* parties to this statute, these instruments provide the means, in certain circumstances, of impleading the mandatory before the International Court.

⁷ General Assembly: Official Records, Sixteenth Session, Supplement No. 12 A (A/4926). See also R. B. Ballinger, *South Africa and the United Nations: Myth and Reality*, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, 1963, pp. 4-7.

However, three fundamental assumptions—by no means self-evident legal propositions—are involved in the applications of Ethiopia and Liberia. The first is that the mandate, despite the demise of the League, was and remains *a treaty or convention in force*. The second is that the international obligations in respect of South West Africa, which South Africa formerly owed to the League, are now owed to the United Nations. The third is that the compulsory jurisdiction clause quoted above justifies a strict literal interpretation of the language employed. That is to say, “any dispute whatever” includes disputes over the general conduct of the administration of the territory as well as disputes arising from the rights of members of the League and their nationals.

Since 1946, South Africa has consistently maintained that whether or not the mandate ever was *a treaty or convention* in terms of the Court’s statute, it lapsed with the dissolution of the League in 1946. Consequently, there could be neither the international obligations alleged, nor international supervision, nor compulsory jurisdiction in respect of it. In the proceedings before the International Court, the South African legal case found its expression in four Preliminary Objections, the main burden of which was to support the conclusion that the governments of Ethiopia and Liberia had:

no locus standi in these contentious proceedings and that the Honourable Court has no jurisdiction to hear or to adjudicate upon the questions of law and fact raised in the Applications and Memorials. . . .⁸

Accordingly, the International Court declared the proceedings on the merits of the case suspended, pending its judgment on the issue of jurisdiction.

On December 21, 1962, the International Court—voting by the slender margin of 8 to 7—found that it has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the merits of the case. After 16 years of United Nations debates and resolutions, the Court has finally rejected the legal founda-

tions of the South African stand. This, surely, is the central theme of the Court’s judgment. The Court is now committed to a detailed examination of the post-war administration of South West Africa in the light of its interpretation of the obligations laid on the mandatory power, and of the allegations of the applicants.

The international implications of this judgment are serious and far-reaching not only for South Africa but for the international community as a whole. The reasons are clear. The applicants are, of course, acting in a representational capacity. The real dispute is between the United Nations and South Africa. For the militantly anti-apartheid and anti-South African leaders in the General Assembly, a judgment against South Africa is simply the last necessary legal formality in a case already morally and politically concluded. But they are fully aware of the impact such a Court judgment must have on those states which have always maintained that the proper approach to the dispute is through the International Court.

Should the Court, in due course, hand down a judgment on the merits of the case against South Africa, the responsibility for implementing its findings will lie with the Republic of South Africa and the United Nations. If a compromise between the two should prove impossible—and the present resolutions of the Assembly seem designed to leave South Africa no room for manoeuvre—then presumably, the majority in the General Assembly will press for positive United Nations action. The dispute could provide the United Nations with one of its most serious crises.

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⁸ International Court of Justice, *South West Africa Cases*; Judgment of December 21, 1962, p. 326.

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

The United Nations Resolution on South Africa

On July 18, an 11-nation United Nations committee studying racial unrest in South Africa unanimously urged the Security Council to ask for an embargo on arms and oil shipments to South Africa until that country abandons its apartheid policies. Similarly, 32 African nations appealed to the U.N. for action. On July 31, the Security Council opened debate. On August 2, United States Ambassador to the U.N. Adlai E. Stevenson said that the U.S. would cease selling military equipment to South Africa January 1, 1964, subject to an end of its segregationist policies. After further debate, the Security Council voted 9-0 (with Britain and France abstaining) in favor of a resolution asking all U.N. members to ban military shipments to South Africa until that state gives up apartheid. The full text of the August 7, 1963, Security Council resolution follows:

The Security Council having considered the question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa, as submitted by the African member states,

Recalling Security Council Resolution S-4300 of 1 April 1960, taking into account that world public opinion has been reflected in General Assembly Resolution 1761 (XVII) and particularly in its paragraphs 4 and 8,

Noting with appreciation the two interim reports of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of South Africa contained in Document S-5310 of 9 May 1963, and Document S-5353 of 17 July 1963,

Noting with concern the recent arms build-up by the Government of South Africa, some of which arms are being used in furtherance of that Government's racial policies,

Regretting that some states are indirectly providing encouragement in various ways to the Government of South Africa to perpetuate, by force, its policy of "apartheid,"

Regretting the failure of the Government of South Africa to accept the invitation of the

Security Council to delegate a representative to appear before it,

Being convinced that the situation in South Africa is seriously disturbing international peace and security,

1. Strongly deprecates the policies of South Africa in its perpetuation of racial discrimination as being inconsistent with the principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations and contrary to its obligations as a member state of the United Nations.

2. Calls upon the Government of South Africa to abandon the policies of apartheid and discrimination as called for in the previous Security Council resolution of 1 April 1960, and to liberate all persons imprisoned, interned or subjected to other restrictions for having opposed the policy of apartheid.

3. Solemnly calls upon all states to cease forthwith the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition of all types and military vehicles to South Africa.

4. Requests the Secretary General to keep the situation in South Africa under observation and to report to the Security Council by 30 October 1963.

BOOK REVIEWS

Africans Moved by Conscience

Jordan Ngubane, Josiah Mwangi Kariuki, Ronald Segal, W. E. Abraham, Kwame Nkrumah and the 12 South Africans whose reports are collected in the slim volume by Marion Friedmann are all Africans, white and black, and their writing provides a moving witness to the revolution that is sweeping Africa today.

I Will Still Be Moved is a collection of documents and speeches, none of which can be read by anyone in South Africa, because these are the words of men and women "who have faced outlawry, exile, banishment and imprisonment for the sake of their beliefs." As the introduction points out, the language of this book "is a sad, ironical tribute to the strength of the liberal tradition in South Africa." All 12 Africans contribute to the reader's understanding. The title of the book is taken from the words of Nelson Mandela, the "Black Pimpernel," who has been banned for inciting persons to strike and for leaving the country without a valid travel document. At a trial for these crimes, Mandela spoke movingly in his own defense: "... when my sentence has been completed, I will still

be moved, as men are always moved by their consciences. . . ."

Another man moved *Into Exile* by his conscience is Ronald Segal, an English-speaking white South African, whose Jewish background has sensitized him to the evils of racism and apartheid. "That white supremacy, the subjugation of twelve million people by three million in South Africa, can survive indefinitely, few if any sane people believe," he writes. He feels that for 1.7 million Afrikaners, survival is "the prize of perpetual war against the finally unvanquishable blacks." Unlike the nation's 1.3 million English speaking whites for whom "the world beyond signals an ultimate asylum," the Afrikaners have no place to go. As Segal points out, "They believe that defeat must mean more than the surrender of privilege. It must mean their submergence by black Africa, or an anguished dispersion among the strange nations of men. . . . A portion of Africa is theirs, by struggle, by possession, by achievement, and by love."

Segal is admittedly a homesick exile; his evaluation of South Africa's future is all the more tragic: "Short of international intervention," he concludes, "... the prospect before South Africa is that of a constant internal haemorrhaging, ending only with the end of all civilized society."

It is perhaps hopeful that Jordan K. Ngubane, an African who has lived in South Africa all his life, has a far more optimistic view of South Africa's future. As *An African Explains Apartheid*, "speed and effective action can still stop bloodshed in South Africa." Studying African nationalism and its "Afrikaner counterpart," Ngubane concludes that "in spite of temperamental, historical and ideological differences the basic urges that have motivated thought and action on both sides are not irreconcilable." Because he be-

I WILL STILL BE MOVED. REPORTS FROM SOUTH AFRICA. EDITED BY MARION FRIEDMANN. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1963. 126 pages and appendix, \$3.95.)

MAU MAU DETAINEE. BY JOSIAH MWANGI KARIUKI. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963. 182 pages, appendix, photographs, index, \$4.75.)

INTO EXILE. BY RONALD SEGAL. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963. 319 pages, \$5.95.)

AN AFRICAN EXPLAINS APARTHEID. BY JORDAN K. NGUBANE. (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1963. 243 pages, \$5.50.)

THE MIND OF AFRICA. BY W. E. ABRAHAM. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1963. 202 pages and index, \$4.00.)

AFRICA MUST UNITE. BY KWAME NKRU-MAH. (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1963. 222 pages and index, \$5.95.)

lieves that "Decisive, coordinated nonracial action is what the times call for if the country has to be saved," he urges that "The British nonracialist, the African advocate of race equality, and the Afrikaner democrat must join hands across the racial or linguistic fences in a vast and irresistible movement of moral and political protest against injustice."

Ngubane prefers an African federation of states which "takes note of the common historical experience of the African Negro"; he disagrees with Nkrumah's ideal of a "vast monolithic state within which the African personality would be the dominant influence." Ngubane dislikes racism in any form. He explains the aberration of apartheid in terms of the history of the Dutch settlers and their struggle for survival.

The white population of Kenya, as described by the *Mau Mau Detainee*, Josiah Mwangi Kariuki, is English-speaking, without a bitter heritage of conflict, but with just as strong an attachment to its highlands as the Afrikaner has to his farm. In Kenya, the African struggle against white supremacy has been just as intense. Kariuki's story of his imprisonment and suffering as a "Mau Mau" is highly subjective and naturally hostile to white Kenyans and the British colonial administration. As he summarizes his explanation for the "Mau Mau" movement, "It has been necessary to create enough strength of feeling among our people to burst through the position which the Europeans built up over the years of their power. . . . Such a feeling does not come from sweet words of love and charity. So in our desperation and weakness we fashioned our unity in a harsher mould."

Out of the struggle and bitterness, the author hopes to see a new Kenya, and, eventually, an approach to "the great ideal of the Pan-Africanists." "We will devote our party and our Nation to the task of achieving unity in Africa as we have in Kenya."

Africa Must Unite and *The Mind of Africa*, both written by Ghanaians, offer the reader additional insight into the Pan African ideal. Both Kwame Nkrumah and W. E. Abraham advocate a united Africa. Both trace the history of their great continent, so that the reader

may understand "the historic processes now moulding the continent of Africa," as W. E. Abraham notes in his preface. Africa's need for political and economic unification is clarified.

W. E. Abraham points out in *The Mind of Africa* that "The identity of the African cultures, impregnated by a common experience of extra-continental domination and common aspirations, creates a magnetic bond which can be used to bind all regions into a pan-Africa."

Kwame Nkrumah, President of Ghana, makes an even more eloquent plea for African unity in *Africa Must Unite*. After tracing the effects of colonialism, Nkrumah criticizes African leaders who fear the loss of Western political and financial support and hesitate to formulate independent policies. He maintains that the operations of the European Common Market will be harmful to African states.

He also affirms that "Africa's interest must be the prime concern of Africa's leaders," and that "The safety and progress of every one of our states can be safeguarded only by the acceptance of this precept, which can best be promoted by our unalloyed unity."

With these basic premises, he challenges the Common Market and other alliances with the West. "... Where associations linking African countries with European powers cut across basic African interests on any level and offer impediments to the goal of union, they must be discarded and rejected where they are offered."

Both Nkrumah and Abraham challenge those sceptics who emphasize differences among the various African states and regions, including differences in size and strength. "We do not intend a relationship of unequal partners," says Nkrumah. "We envisage the African Union as a free merging together of peoples with a common history and a common destiny." Many Westerners and many African leaders may disagree with the Ghanaian dream of pan-Africa. But these two persuasive and informative studies add to the background on this significant issue.

T. H. B.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of October, 1963, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Berlin

Oct. 11—A U.S. convoy is blocked by Soviet armor on the autobahn from West Germany to West Berlin. Soviet guards demand that the U.S. troops dismount and be counted. U.S. officers reject the demand. On October 10, the same convoy had been similarly delayed for 15 hours at Marienborn. The U.S. protests to the Soviet Union.

Oct. 12—Soviet troops permit the U.S. convoy to continue to Berlin.

Oct. 16—Soviet guards detain a British army convoy en route from West Berlin to West Germany for 9 hours at the autobahn checkpoint outside Berlin.

Comecon

Oct. 24—A communiqué released by Tass (Soviet press agency) reveals that, at the the meeting of Comecon which began on October 14 and just ended, the 8 member nations agreed to establish a multi-nation payments system and an International Bank of Economic Collaboration.

Disarmament

Oct. 1—Members of the International Atomic Energy Agency overwhelmingly approve agreement on a nuclear reactor inspection system. This first Russian approval of international inspection of nuclear facilities marks the end of the Agency's seventh annual general conference.

Oct. 10—The nuclear test ban treaty goes into effect, with ceremonies in Washington, London and Moscow noting the event. The treaty, with over 100 signees, prohibits nuclear testing in space, the atmosphere and underwater, while allowing continued testing underground.

European Economic Community

(See also *U.S. Foreign Policy*.)

Oct. 14—Iran signs the first strictly commercial agreement between the Common Market (E.E.C.) and an outside nation.

Oct. 16—A week of confidential preliminary meetings begins in Brussels to discuss items set for consideration between Common Market representatives and United States negotiators during next year's "Kennedy round."

Oct. 21—Common Market agricultural ministers begin a four-day conference behind closed doors in Brussels to plan over-all farm policy.

Oct. 26—Relations between France and Britain show marked improvement at the end of a 2-day meeting at the Hague between the Common Market Cabinet ministers and Britain.

Oct. 29—Gatt names 5 to arbitrate the "chicken war" dispute between the Common Market and the United States. Their findings are expected about November 18th.

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)

Oct. 2—The 10 leading non-Communist industrial powers announce plans for the first major study of the world's financial system since the Bretton Woods Conference 20 years ago. This study is to be led by Robert Roosa, United States Under-Secretary of the Treasury and is to be completed in time for next September's World Fund Meeting in Tokyo.

International Cocoa Conference

Oct. 25—U.S. State Department officials say that the announced failure of the International Cocoa Conference to reach any agreement after 5 weeks of secret meetings

brings to a standstill the whole issue of international commodity agreements.

International Labor Organization

Oct. 5—The I.L.O. announces plans to start a world clearing house for information on the economic and social consequences of automation. The United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union (for the first time) agree to make all their data available for on-the-spot inspection.

Nato (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)

Oct. 11—Envoys from the United States, Britain, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Greece and Turkey open talks to plan an integrated atom fleet for the defense of Europe. The Netherlands is expected to join the meeting as an observer.

United Nations

Oct. 1—U.N. Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson tells the 111 members of the General Assembly's Social Committee that the U.S. is mobilizing to "destroy racial discrimination in this society forever."

Oct. 2—Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir warns the General Assembly that a "constant stream" of weapons is pouring into Arab countries and that Israel cannot "remain indifferent" to these preparations for war against her.

Oct. 3—Belgium promises to pay her share for the U.N. Congo force in 1964, but reliable sources say no decision has been reached as to her back assessments.

Oct. 4—Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia addresses the General Assembly.

Oct. 7—Cuba's chief representative, Carlos M. Lechuga Hevia, accuses the U.S. of directing relentless aggression against Cuba.

Oct. 8—With no official vote taken after the Soviet Union withdraws its earlier objection, the General Assembly President, Dr. Carlos Sosa Rodriguez, announces agreement to send a U.N. fact-finding mission to South Vietnam. This move is in answer to the Diem government's request for a study of oppression of Buddhists there.

Oct. 10—A 106-1 vote in the General As-

sembly condemns South Africa for not complying with earlier resolutions on apartheid and urges the release of all political prisoners. With 4 smaller nations absent, South Africa casts the only dissenting vote. (See also *South Africa*.)

Oct. 12—Albania introduces a resolution that the U.N. expel Nationalist China.

Oct. 14—The General Assembly calls on Britain to refrain from transferring political and military power to the present regime in Southern Rhodesia by a 90-2 vote. Only Portugal and South Africa vote against the measure; Britain is recorded as absent.

Oct. 16—Secretary General U Thant tells 111 member nations that the U.N. cost will run \$83,000,000 in 1964, an increase of almost \$3,000,000 over 1963.

Oct. 17—The General Assembly adopts a resolution banning nuclear weapons in space by acclamation. Preliminary agreement by the Big Three was reached at an October 3rd meeting of the foreign ministers.

Oct. 18—Bolivia and the Ivory Coast win two-year terms in the Security Council. Czechoslovakia and Malaysia are still deadlocked in contest for the third open seat.

By a vote of 76-11, the General Assembly acts to keep U.N. forces in the Congo until June 30, 1964. Only Cuba joins the Soviet-bloc nations in opposition.

Oct. 21—The General Assembly votes to continue the ban on Communist Chinese membership in the U.N. Albania's resolution to replace Nationalist China with Communist China is defeated by 57 votes to 41, with 12 countries abstaining and 1 absent.

Oct. 22—President Tito of Yugoslavia addresses the General Assembly.

Oct. 24—The United Nations celebrates its 18th birthday.

Oct. 28—The General Assembly's Social Committee adopts a declaration against all forms of racial discrimination by a 89-0 vote. The U.S., among the 17 abstainers, opposes the measure saying that the provision requiring all nations to outlaw organizations that "promote" racial discrimination is unacceptable.

Oct. 30—The U.S. orders the expulsion of 3 members of the Soviet mission to the U.N. as the result of spy charges.

ALGERIA

Oct. 1—President Ahmed Ben Bella, speaking at a rally, announces that all French-owned farms will be nationalized; some 1 million hectares, or 2.47 million acres, will be affected by the land seizure order.

Oct. 2—A government spokesman announces that Parliament will be asked to vote emergency powers to enable the government to counter the 4-day-old revolt in the Kabylia region, led by Hocine Ait-Ahmed and Colonel Mohand ou el Hadj.

Oct. 3—President Ahmed Ben Bella tells the National Assembly that he is assuming exceptional powers for putting down armed opposition to his government by the Socialist Forces' Front.

Oct. 7—A spokesman for the Defense Ministry announces that Morocco has agreed to recall its troops from the Algerian frontier. Moroccan troops were sent to the border area following the Kabylia revolt on September 29.

Oct. 11—Government troops fight with members of the Socialist Forces Front in the Kabylia mountain region.

Oct. 12—Ben Bella urges rebels to end their opposition and reaffirm their loyalty to his government. He calls a congress of the ruling National Liberation Front for 1964 to air grievances.

Oct. 14—The Algerian government announces that Moroccan forces have entered some 25 miles into Algerian territory; fighting between Algerian and Moroccan troops is reported. The Sahara frontier area is poorly defined, and has been in dispute between the 2 nations.

Oct. 16—Negotiations on the border fight are renewed by representatives of Ben Bella and King Hassan II of Morocco.

Oct. 19—Air, rail and road routes to Morocco are closed by Algeria.

Oct. 21—Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie arrives in Algeria from Morocco in an effort to mediate the border hostilities.

Oct. 22—Algerian Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika rejects Ethiopia's plan for a 3-power conference to mediate the dispute.

Oct. 24—Ben Bella announces that Colonel Mohand ou el Hadj, one of the leaders of the Kabylia revolt, has joined the border fight against Morocco.

Oct. 27—A government source reports that the Moroccan army has attacked an Algerian force and taken over 200 prisoners.

Oct. 28—Morocco announces that its troops have advanced further into Algerian territory in the southwest Sahara.

Ben Bella declares that the fight with the Kabyle rebels "has been resolved in the face of the external danger."

Oct. 29—In Mali, Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie and Mali President Modibo Keita confer separately with Ben Bella and King Hassan II on negotiating a ceasefire.

Oct. 30—King Hassan II and Ben Bella sign a ceasefire agreement, to become effective at midnight on November 1. The agreement also provides for a commission of Malian, Ethiopian, Algerian and Moroccan delegates to create a demilitarized border zone.

ARGENTINA

Oct. 12—Dr. Arturo Illia is inaugurated as president. Illia states that Argentina will cancel contracts with foreign oil companies signed during the regime of ex-President Arturo Frondizi.

Oct. 17—It is reported that government permission has been granted to supporters of ex-dictator Juan Perón for a meeting tonight.

BOLIVIA

(See U.S. Foreign Policy.)

BRAZIL

Oct. 4—President João Goulart asks Congress to approve a 30-day state of siege to meet "serious internal commotion" (i.e., strikes, inflation and subversion). He acts at the urging of military leaders.

Oct. 7—Following opposition to his request, Goulart withdraws his request that state of siege powers be invoked.

Oct. 15—Governor Carlos Lacerda of Guana-
bara state accuses aides of President Goul-
art of plotting against his life.

Oct. 18—The Chamber of Deputies names
a 7-man commission to inquire into a plot
against Lacerda.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

Australia

Oct. 15—Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies
reveals that he is scheduling elections for
the 120-member lower house of Parliament
on Nov. 30—13 months before its 3-year
term expires—because his Liberal party-
Country coalition has a working majority
of only one.

Canada

Oct. 9—Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson tells
Parliament that Canada has expanded its
August 18, 1963, agreement to allow the
U.S. to supply U.S. and Canadian air de-
fense forces in Canada with nuclear air-
to-air arms.

Oct. 11—Voting 181 to 4, Commons passes
the second reading of a plan to set up a
government trusteeship over the Seafarers
International Union because of maritime
disputes involving this group and 4 other
Canadian maritime unions. The dispute
has tied up Great Lakes shipping. U.S.
interference is criticized by Pearson.

Oct. 20—The Government orders members of
the Seafarers Union to return to work.

Oct. 22—Pearson wins a vote of confidence
on his handling of the maritime dispute.

Oct. 23—The Government names 3 trustees
to administer the five maritime unions
whose dispute has tied up Great Lakes
shipping.

Oct. 24—The Seafarers International votes
to return to work.

Oct. 29—Pearson's Government defeats 2
parliamentary motions of censure.

Great Britain

Oct. 10—After undergoing major surgery,
Prime Minister Harold Macmillan notifies
the Conservative party that he is retiring.

Oct. 18—On recommendation of Prime
Minister Macmillan, Queen Elizabeth II

asks the Earl of Home to be the next Prime
Minister.

Oct. 19—After Conservative party resistance
to his leadership ends, the Earl of Home
accepts the prime ministership.

Oct. 20—The Earl of Home announces the
names of his cabinet members including:
R. A. Butler as Foreign Secretary; Selwyn
Lloyd as Lord Privy Seal; Reginald Maud-
ling as Chancellor of the Exchequer. Iain
Macleod, leader of the House of Commons,
and Enoch Powell, Minister of Health, re-
fuse to serve in the new 23-minister cabinet.

Oct. 22—Attorney General Sir John Hobson
is cleared of charges of professional mis-
conduct in connection with the deportation
to Nigeria of Chief Anthony Enahoro. This
is the first time in history that an Attorney
General has been asked to defend his
actions professionally before the disciplinary
body of the legal profession.

Oct. 23—The Earl of Home becomes a com-
moner; he will be known as Sir Alec
Douglas-Home.

Oct. 24—Deferring to the wishes of the new
Prime Minister despite Labor and Liberal
party opposition, Parliament recesses until
November 12.

India

Oct. 21—India and the U.S. sign agreements
in New Delhi providing U.S. loans of
\$39.6 million, bringing to \$5,023,100,000
the total of U.S. foreign aid commitments
to India since 1951.

Oct. 23—India protests to U.N. observers in
Kashmir because of the "concentration of
Pakistani troops" in Chaknot, on the cease-
fire line.

Oct. 25—India and Pakistan exchange warn-
ings that the cease-fire line must be re-
spected.

Malaysia, Federation of

Oct. 8—In Singapore, some 60,000 leftist
workers begin a 2-day general strike pro-
testing the Government's plan to outlaw the
Malaysian Federation's 7 largest unions.

Oct. 9—The Government reveals it is taking
over control of Indonesian bank accounts
in Malaysia.

Nigeria

Oct. 1—Nnamdi Azikiwe becomes President of the new Republic of Nigeria.

Pakistan

Oct. 4—In Washington, Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto informs U.S. President John F. Kennedy that Pakistan will continue to "normalize" her relations with Communist China.

Oct. 7—Pakistan and the Soviet Union sign a civil air agreement.

Uganda

Oct. 4—The National Assembly elects the Kabaka (king) of Buganda, Mutesa II, as first President of Uganda for a 5-year term. Political power in Uganda is vested in Prime Minister Sir Milton Obote.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Basutoland

Oct. 21—A constitutional commission set up two years ago to represent all political parties recommends independence for Basutoland by 1965; it suggests that the country be renamed Lesotho.

Gambia

Oct. 4—Prime Minister David Jawara promises to work toward full independence as Gambia is granted full internal self-rule.

Guiana

Oct. 25—Premier Cheddi Jagan and leaders of the major Opposition parties ask the British government to impose a constitutional settlement so that Guiana's independence will not be delayed further.

Oct. 31—Duncan Sandys' Commonwealth and Colonial Secretary, rules that a general election must be held under a system of proportional representation before independence. Jagan attacks this "unprincipled decision."

Kenya

Oct. 8—The Sultan of Zanzibar yields nominal sovereignty of the Mombasa coastal strip and other possessions to Kenya.

Oct. 19—In London, 3 weeks of conferences on constitutional changes close. The Kenya

government receives additional authority; December 12 is confirmed as Independence Day.

BURMA

Oct. 19—The government enacts the Nationalization Act, under which it may nationalize any private company.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

Oct. 1—At a parade marking the fourteenth anniversary of the Chinese Communist Republic, the Mayor of Peking, Peng Chen, declares that world war can be averted and "world peace can be preserved."

Oct. 9—In an interview in Japan, Premier Chou En-lai declares that the "the Chinese-Soviet treaty of alliance and amity is still alive." He states that China has no intention of ending diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

Oct. 28—*Kyodo* (Japanese news agency) reports that Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chen Yi has told visiting Japanese newsmen that his country will not be able to test atomic weapons for several years; and that it will be even longer before China can mass produce atomic bombs.

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Leopoldville)

Oct. 1—Following his dissolution of the parliament and the calling of a constitutional commission to draft a new constitution, President Joseph Kasavubu gives full legislative powers to Premier Cyrille Adoula.

Oct. 21—A state of emergency is proclaimed in Leopoldville by Adoula to prevent a general strike scheduled for tomorrow.

Oct. 24—It is announced that the leaders of the 3 largest labor unions have been arrested because they were leading a strike of civil servants and teachers in Leopoldville.

CUBA

Oct. 30—Premier Fidel Castro accuses the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency of operating a raider ship used in espionage activity against Cuba.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Oct. 3—The Vatican announces that The Most Rev. Josef Beran, Archbishop of Prague and Primate of Czechoslovakia, and 4 other bishops have been released by the Czech Communist government.

DAHOMY

Oct. 27—Chief of Staff Colonel Christophe Soglo announces that a 3-man provisional government has been established following the dissolution of parliament. The new government is formed following a wave of strikes and demonstrations.

Oct. 28—Colonel Soglo seizes control of the government.

Oct. 29—Soglo reappoints the 3-man provisional government. Ex-President Hubert Maga is the new prime minister.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Oct. 1—Deposed President Juan D. Bosch arrives in Puerto Rico, following a military coup last week.

Oct. 7—Anti-riot policemen battle with university students at the campus of the University of Santo Domingo. The police action is designed to head off a march by university students to demand that constitutional government be restored.

Oct. 12—The military-supported civilian junta and the 6 political parties backing it announce a 4-phase plan for the gradual restoration of democratic rule.

It is reported that last night members of the Congress, which has been dissolved, revealed that they have elected Senate President Juan Casanovas Garrido as provisional chief of state.

Oct. 13—The Social Christian Revolutionary party (third largest) rejects the junta's plans to restore democracy; it recognizes Casanovas as provisional head of state.

Oct. 15—The junta issues a statement charging the U.S. with "unprecedented interference"; the charge is made in reply to an alleged proposal by the U.S. chargé d'affaires yesterday, urging the junta to yield power to Casanovas.

Oct. 20—Anti-government demonstrations are broken up by police using gas and clubs;

approximately fifty persons are arrested.

FRANCE

(See also *Algeria* and *U.S. Foreign Policy*.)

Oct. 2—France protests Algeria's seizure of French-owned farms in Algeria.

Oct. 5—Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville arrives in Washington to confer with U.S. President Kennedy and Secretary of State Dean Rusk.

Oct. 9—It is reported that France has disclosed that the first element of its nuclear striking force is now operational. It consists of an unknown number of Mirage-IV supersonic bombers equipped with 40-kiloton plutonium atomic bombs.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

Oct. 9—Chancellor Konrad Adenauer declares that the Western countries should demand the removal of the Berlin wall as a prerequisite to the sale of grain to the U.S.S.R.

Oct. 11—Chancellor Adenauer delivers his letter of resignation to President Heinrich Lübke. He has served for 14 years.

Oct. 16—Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard is elected to the chancellorship by 279 votes in the 484-member Bundestag (lower house of parliament).

Oct. 17—Erhard submits to parliament the list of his new cabinet; there are few changes in the Cabinet as it existed under Adenauer.

Oct. 18—Chancellor Erhard presents a 2-hour statement before parliament; he announces that he will follow a "middle way" policy.

Oct. 21—It is disclosed that West Germany has requested that the U.S. clarify a statement by U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell P. Gilpatric that the U.S. armed forces overseas may be gradually reduced. (See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*.)

GERMANY, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (East)

Oct. 20—Elections to the *Volkskammer* (parliament) are held.

HONDURAS

Oct. 3—Colonel Osvaldo Lopez leads the armed forces in a military coup against the government of President Ramon Villeda

Morales. Villeda Morales is sent into exile in Costa Rica.

Oct. 4—It is reported that Colonel Lopez has issued a decree proclaiming himself as chief of state. The decree also ordered the dissolution of the legislature.

Oct. 5—A new cabinet is sworn in; it is made up mainly of civilians.

INDONESIA

Oct. 3—Foreign Minister Subandrio declares that his country is willing to negotiate its differences with Malaysia, but is not "begging for negotiations."

Oct. 14—The Indonesian government halts all commercial radio and cable communications with Malaya.

IRAN

Oct. 6—Shah Mohammad Riza Pahlevi opens the new session of parliament; parliament has been suspended for over 2 years.

Oct. 16—French President Charles de Gaulle arrives in Iran for a 4-day state visit.

Oct. 21—Premier Assadollah Alam offers his resignation to the Shah. He is immediately renamed premier.

IRAQ

Oct. 11—It is reported that Sheik Ahmed al-Barzani (considered the unofficial religious leader of the Kurds) has surrendered to the Iraqi government. The Sheik is the eldest brother of the Kurds' rebel leader, General Mullah Mustafa al-Barzani.

Oct. 20—A statement during a radio broadcast reveals that Syrian forces are assisting Iraqi troops in fighting Kurdish rebels.

ISRAEL

Oct. 21—At the opening session of the winter session of parliament (*Knesset*), Premier Levi Eshkol announces that travel restrictions on Arabs living in 2 military government areas have been lifted.

ITALY

Oct. 29—The thirty-fifth congress of the Italian Socialist party approves a request by Pietro Nenni (leader of the left-wing Socialists) for authorization to participate in a center-left government. The vote is 278,324 in favor, 190,492 opposed. The party ends its 5-day meeting.

JAPAN

Oct. 23—The parliament (Diet) is dissolved by Premier Hayato Ikeda to prepare for the elections scheduled for November 21.

KOREA, SOUTH

Oct. 15—Presidential elections are held.

Oct. 18—The Central Election Management Committee tentatively names General Chung Hee Park the new president. He received a total of 4.7 million votes to his closest rival's (ex-President Posun Yun) 4.5 million.

Oct. 21—The military junta's standing committee decides to convene the first session of the National Assembly on December 17; at that time, President Park will assume the duties of his new office. The government announces that National Assembly elections are scheduled for November 26.

LAOS

Oct. 30—Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma arrives in the U.S.S.R. for talks with Soviet leaders and is greeted by Premier Khrushchev. He appeals for Soviet aid in restoring stability to Laos.

MOROCCO

(See also *Algeria*.)

Oct. 31—Morocco suspends diplomatic ties with Cuba; it recalls its ambassadors to Syria and the U.A.R. The Moroccan government charges that the 3 countries were hostile during its border fight with Algeria.

SOUTH AFRICA, REPUBLIC OF

Oct. 9—The South African government indicts 11 African nationalists and sympathizers (6 Africans, 4 whites, 1 Indian) on charges of conspiracy, in violation of the sabotage law. Among the accused are Walter M. Sisulu and Nelson Mandela, of the banned African Nationalist Congress party.

Oct. 29—The trial of the 11 defendants begins.

Oct. 30—A Supreme Court judge upholds the arguments for the defense that the charges are "fatally defective" because specific allegations are lacking. The charges against 10 of the 11 defendants are dismissed. They are rearrested by police. The elev-

enth defendant has been taken into "protective custody," because he agreed to testify for the state.

Oct. 31—The South African government announces that it will try the 10 defendants again on charges of violating the government's sabotage law.

SPAIN

Oct. 20—The Spanish government publishes an outline of a 4-year national development plan. The purpose of the plan is to provide full employment and increase production; some \$5.5 billion in public and private investment is called for during the period 1964-1967.

Oct. 25—The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development grants a \$33 million loan to Spain for the improvement of her highways.

SWITZERLAND

Oct. 28—It is reported that in the national elections held last weekend, the Socialists gained 3 parliamentary seats; they have 53 members in parliament.

TUNISIA

Oct. 4—President Habib Bourguiba announces that France will evacuate the Bizerte naval base by October 15. France began to withdraw from the base in 1962. Paris confirms the evacuation agreement.

U.S.S.R., THE

Oct. 1—*Izvestia* (government newspaper) publishes a speech of last Thursday by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev telling the Soviet people for the first time of the wheat purchased from other countries. Khrushchev estimates that total purchases and loans equalled some 9 million metric tons.

Oct. 6—Tass (official Soviet press agency) discloses in its English language edition that Soviet domestic grain supplies will be some 18 per cent below those of 1962.

Oct. 17—The annual publication of slogans preceding the celebration of the October Revolution warns that no "real relaxation of international tension" is possible until the U.S. adopts a "hands off Cuba" policy.

Oct. 23—Tass quotes from an article in the latest issue of *Kommunist* (the official theo-

retical party magazine) in which the Soviet Communist party urges Communists everywhere to oppose the Chinese Communist effort to substitute "Maoism" for "Leninism."

Oct. 26—Soviet Premier Khrushchev declares that the Soviet Union does "not wish to compete" in putting a man on the moon; he rejects a U.S. proposal for a Soviet-American joint manned lunar flight.

Izvestia publishes statements by Khrushchev urging that the Soviet Union and Communist China end their ideological quarrel and "permit time" to decide which camp is correct.

In an interview published in *Izvestia*, Khrushchev states that the Soviet Union may refuse to purchase U.S. wheat if "any discriminatory conditions" are imposed. (See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*.)

UNITED STATES

Civil Rights

(See *Segregation and Civil Rights*)

Foreign Policy

Oct. 2—In Washington, Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie meets for two days with President Kennedy.

After a meeting of the National Security Council at the White House, a formal statement is issued warning that the repressive measures taken by the South Vietnam government may significantly affect the war effort. (See also *Vietnam*.)

Oct. 4—It is reported in Washington that President John F. Kennedy has recalled the C.I.A. chief in South Vietnam, John H. Richardson, for "consultation."

The U.S. announces that all economic and military air personnel is being withdrawn from Honduras and the Dominican Republic in the light of military coups there. (See also *Honduras* and the *Dominican Republic*.)

Oct. 8—Two days of discussions between U.S. diplomats and French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville in Washington focus on U.S.-French differences.

Oct. 9—President Kennedy gives approval to the projected sale of \$250 million worth of

wheat to the U.S.S.R., for use only in the Soviet Union and Communist China. This approval extends also to the sale of some \$60 million worth of additional wheat to Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary, bringing the total to some \$310 million. The wheat is to be transported when possible in American ships.

Oct. 11—The Department of State reveals that 2 Soviet spy suspects have been exchanged for 2 Americans held in the U.S.S.R. on espionage charges.

Oct. 12—In Washington, Canadian Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson and President Kennedy confer on the Canadian Great Lakes labor dispute that threatens Canadian shipping and a possible closing of the St. Lawrence Seaway. (See also *British Commonwealth, Canada*.)

Oct. 15—The President welcomes Eire's Prime Minister Sean Lemass.

Oct. 16—The European Common Market and the U.S. reveal that they have agreed to submit the dispute about tariffs on U.S. poultry exports to a 3-man neutral panel which will determine the extent of U.S. damage from the increased Common Market tariff on U.S. poultry.

Oct. 17—The President welcomes President Tito of Yugoslavia as a guest of the Government.

Oct. 22—The President welcomes Bolivian President Victor Paz Estenssoro on his arrival for a 5-day visit.

Cuban MIG jet fighters attack an American owned ore ship when the ship accidentally sails into a fight between Cuban coastal defenses and a raiding party.

Oct. 23—A State Department representative reveals that Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge will soon return from Saigon to confer with President Kennedy.

Oct. 25—The U.S. and Brazil sign an agreement under which a loan of \$25.4 million will be used by Brazil for loans to small and medium sized industries.

Oct. 29—The U.S. charges that North Vietnam has broken the Geneva agreement by renewing arms shipments to pro-Communists in Laos.

Oct. 31—The President says he doubts the Soviet Union has given up the race to the moon. (See also *U.S.S.R.*)

The President pledges that U.S. combat forces in West Germany will not be reduced; noncombat personnel will be reduced.

Government

Oct. 1—The Senate Finance Committee turns down a motion to accelerate hearings on the Administration's tax bill.

The Senate votes to allow former Presidents to speak on the Senate floor if appropriate notice is given.

Oct. 2—The President signs a bill raising pay for 2 million members of the armed forces some \$1.2 billion.

Oct. 3—Dedicating a dam in Arkansas in the "new South," President Kennedy hears Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus describe his civil rights program as a program of "civil wrongs."

Oct. 7—The President signs the nuclear test ban treaty.

Oct. 8—Congress sends the President a compromise \$47.2 billion defense appropriations bill for fiscal 1964.

Oct. 14—Secretary of the Navy Fred Korth's resignation is announced by the White House. The President names Paul H. Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense, to replace him.

The White House receives a bill authorizing \$50 billion for loans to finance housing for elderly Americans.

Oct. 21—President Kennedy reveals that almost every item on the United States tariff list of almost 6,000 products is subject to reduction in the 1964 tariff negotiations.

Major steel companies reveal that they have been subpoenaed to appear before a federal grand jury inquiring into steel price fixing.

Oct. 22—President Kennedy promises to make every effort to explain publicly the reason for large scale scientific experiments before they are authorized.

The Senate ratifies a treaty revising a treaty pending since 1960 providing for

extradition of U.S. fugitives from justice taking refuge in Brazil.

Oct. 23—The Senate Rules Committee reveals plans to investigate the business affairs of Robert G. Baker, former secretary to the Senate Democratic majority.

The President meets with Republican and Democratic House leaders to seek agreement on civil rights legislation.

Oct. 24—The President signs a bill providing \$265 million over a 5-year period for research on problems of retardation.

Oct. 28—Former Senator Tom Connally of Texas dies at 86.

Oct. 29—Senate Democratic leader Mike Mansfield of Montana says it is possible the Senate may not recess until one minute before the 1964 session opens Jan. 3.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation announces the arrest of a Russian chauffeur and a U.S. electrical engineer for espionage conspiracy.

The Administration asks Congress to raise the temporary national debt ceiling to \$315 billion for the last 7 months of fiscal 1964.

Oct. 30—President Kennedy names J. Dewey Daane, Deputy Undersecretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs, to succeed G. H. King, Jr., on the Federal Reserve Board.

Oct. 31—The President denies that Fred Korth is guilty of conflict of interest in the TFX case.

The President signs a bill providing \$329 million for a mental health program, including matching grants for community mental health centers.

Labor

Oct. 19—The Department of Labor makes public revised standards designed to eliminate racial discrimination in apprenticeship programs.

Military

Oct. 4—Defense Secretary Robert McNamara ends special duty pay for overseas servicemen.

Oct. 16—The U.S. orbits the first of twin

satellites aimed at detecting any violation of the nuclear test ban treaty in outer space.

Oct. 24—The "Big Lift" of an armored division and supporting troops from Fort Hood, Texas, to West Germany is completed 9 hours ahead of schedule in 63 hours.

Oct. 26—The Atomic Energy Commission sets off a 12 kiloton underground explosion aimed at discovering whether such an explosion can be distinguished from an earthquake by a nuclear test detection monitor.

Politics

Oct. 1—Speaking in Belgium, New York's Governor Nelson Rockefeller says he will not run on a Republican ticket for vice-president with Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater running for President.

Oct. 12—Rockefeller asks Goldwater to debate with him on policies of the Republican party. Goldwater declines.

Oct. 30—President Kennedy speaks of the importance of civil rights at a fund raising dinner in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

Oct. 31—At his news conference, President Kennedy says there is "no question" that Vice-President Lyndon Johnson will run again for the vice-presidency on the Democratic ticket.

Segregation and Civil Rights

Oct. 1—In Cambridge, Maryland, white voters reject a public accommodation act aimed at ending racial discrimination in restaurants, lunch counters and the city's sole hotel.

Oct. 9—Former President Eisenhower declares that the 1954 Supreme Court decision outlawing public school segregation is "morally and legally" correct.

Oct. 14—Birmingham's Mayor Albert Boutwell says he will not be pressured into hiring Negro policemen.

Oct. 22—In response to a boycott called by civil rights groups, almost half the children in public schools in Chicago, Illinois—some 225,000—stay away from classes.

Martin Luther King, head of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, withdraws his ultimatum to Birmingham demanding the hiring of 25 Negro policemen

at once. He says he knows that the city plans to hire some Negroes for the police force soon.

Oct. 26—The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights charges that the Department of Defense forces Negro servicemen to live in slums because it lacks an aggressive policy to force open housing for them.

Oct. 29—Roger M. Blough, chairman of U.S. Steel, denies that his company should attempt to impose its racial views on Birmingham. U.S. Steel is the city's largest employer.

Supreme Court

Oct. 7—The Supreme Court's fall term opens.

Oct. 14—The Court directs the Florida Supreme Court to reconsider cases concerning 10 Florida prisoners convicted without lawyers before the Court's decision of March, 1963, that needy defendants in criminal cases in state courts must be provided with lawyers at the state's expense.

Oct. 21—The Court refuses to reconsider its decision of June 3, 1963, in the Colorado waters decision case.

The Court in a 3-line ruling reverses a decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court convicting 373 Negro students on charges of breach of the peace caused by a protest march in Orangeburg, South Carolina.

Justices Arthur Goldberg, William O. Douglas and William J. Brennan Jr., in a dissent from the Court's refusal to review 2 rape convictions carrying death sentences, suggest that executing a man for rape in the twentieth century may be a "cruel and unusual punishment" violating the 8th Amendment.

Oct. 29—Chief Justice Earl Warren is jeered at and threatened by pickets shouting "Impeach Warren" as he leaves the New York City Bar Association building after being made an honorary member of the bar association.

VATICAN, THE

Oct. 9—The Ecumenical Council votes approval of an amendment allowing a priest to deliver part of the mass in the vernacular.

Another amendment is approved requiring a sermon at masses on holy days or Sundays when a congregation is present.

VENEZUELA

Oct. 3—The Supreme Court upholds the government's suspension of 2 extremist parties, the Communist party and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left.

Oct. 5—It is reported that some 300 Communist and other extremists leaders have been arrested.

Oct. 9—Terrorists strike in Caracas.

VIETNAM, SOUTH

Oct. 5—A sixth Buddhist monk commits suicide by burning himself to death.

Oct. 7—Mrs. Ngo Dinh Nhu, sister-in-law of President Ngo Dinh Diem, arrives in the U.S. for an unofficial coast-to-coast trip to explain Vietnamese policies.

Oct. 17—The brother of Ngo Dinh Diem, Ngo Dinh Nhu, charges that Americans tried to organize a revolt by Buddhist monks.

Oct. 20—In fighting yesterday and today in the Mekong delta, government troops are defeated by a Communist Viet Cong battalion.

Oct. 24—A U.N. mission arrives in South Vietnam to investigate charges that Buddhist monks are persecuted by the government.

YEMEN

Oct. 30—U.N. Secretary General U Thant announces that the U.N. observation mission in Yemen will be withdrawn shortly; his decision was determined by Saudi Arabia's refusal to continue to pay its share of the costs.

Oct. 31—U Thant announces that the U.N. observer team will remain until January 4, 1964; Saudi Arabia has agreed to pay half the costs for the 2-month period.

YUGOSLAVIA

(See also *Int'l., U.N. and U.S. Foreign Policy*)

Oct. 20—President Tito arrives in the United States.

Oct. 25—Tito departs for Britain.

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